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Abstract
We propose and analyze a recipient-anonymous stochastic routing model to study
a fundamental trade-off between anonymity and routing delay. An agent wants to
quickly reach a goal vertex in a network through a sequence of routing actions, while
an overseeing adversary observes the agent’s entire trajectory and tries to identify her
goal among those vertices traversed. We are interested in understanding the probability
that the adversary can correctly identify the agent’s goal (anonymity), as a function of
the time it takes the agent to reach it (delay). A key feature of our model is the presence
of intrinsic uncertainty in the environment, so that each of the agent’s intended steps
is subject to random perturbation and thus may not materialize as planned.
Using large-network asymptotics, our main results provide near-optimal character-
ization of the anonymity-delay trade-off under a number of network topologies. We
establish an asymptotically tight characterization of the anonymity-delay trade-off in
complete graphs, showing that (1) any level of intrinsic uncertainty will lead to a strictly
positive delay overhead for the agent, even as her delay budget tends to infinity, and (2)
a carefully designed routing policy can ensure the overhead is only additive with respect
to the level of the uncertainty. We further extend the results to networks generated by
random graph models, and settings where the network structure can be designed. In
both cases, we show it is possible to achieve an additive overhead even for relatively
sparse, non-complete networks. Our main technical contributions are centered around
a new class of “noise-harnessing” routing strategies that adaptively combine intrinsic
uncertainty from the environment with additional artificial randomization to achieve
provably efficient obfuscation.1
Keywords: anonymity, stochastic routing, networks, prediction, random walk.
1 Introduction
The advancement in machine learning and data collection infrastructure has made it in-
creasingly effortless for companies and governmental entities to collect and analyze the
behaviors and actions of individuals or competitors (Valentino-DeVries et al. (2018), Mayer
et al. (2016), De Montjoye et al. (2013)). Such analysis enables the entity to make powerful
predictions on sensitive information that an individual under monitoring would like to keep
private. These emerging trends have spurred in recent years a growing literature on design-
ing privacy-aware decision-making policies, whereby the decision maker would deliberately
1This version: August 2020. This is an updated version of an earlier manuscript titled “Dynamically
Protecting Privacy, under Uncertainty”.
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employ randomization in order to obfuscate certain sensitive information from an adversary
(cf. Fanti et al. (2015), Luo et al. (2016), Tossou and Dimitrakakis (2016), Tsitsiklis and Xu
(2018), Tang et al. (2020)).
Motivated by privacy concerns in applications arising in networking and secure logistics,
and inspired by an anonymous path-planning problem studied in Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018), we
propose and analyze in this paper a stochastic routing problem that protects the anonymity
of the recipient. The model concerns an agent who traverses an underlying network to
deliver an item or package, and her goal is to obfuscate the identity of the true recipient of
the item even when the route is observable by an adversary. Our model departs from the
prevailing literature in a major aspect: the routing dynamics in our model are subject to
intrinsic uncertainty, in the sense that the agent’s routing trajectory is perturbed by random
shocks in the environment and may deviate from the agent’s intended movements. The
majority of existing work on anonymity-aware decision-making, on the other hand, assume
the decision maker has perfect control, so that their action maps to changes in the system
in a deterministic manner; examples include the state updates in Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018),
routing of payments in Tang et al. (2020), and dissemination of messages in Fanti et al.
(2015). To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to provide formal performance
and anonymity guarantees in a decision-making problem under intrinsic uncertainty.
There are at least two main reasons why it is important to consider models with intrinsic
uncertainty. First, random perturbations and stochastic shocks are inherent in a wide array
of real-world systems (Sezer et al. 2015, Jaillet et al. 2016, Flajolet et al. 2017). For example,
in a distributed network, computer nodes may experience random outages, rendering a
link occasionally non-available, and similarly, roads may become difficult to traverse due to
accidents, traffic, or unforeseen maintenance. Models that assume perfect control thus fail to
capture these situations. Second, going from a model of perfect control to one with intrinsic
uncertainty requires a fundamental redesign of policies, rather than minor modifications of
existing algorithms. Our analysis suggests that having perfect control in a routing problem
significantly simplifies the design of anonymity-aware policies, largely because it allows the
decision maker to precisely control the type of randomization she wishes to implement. In
contrast, intrinsic uncertainty tends to severely limit the range of randomization at the
decision maker’s disposal. Indeed, a main finding of our work is that designing efficient
decision policies in the presence of uncertainty requires new ideas, such as noise harnessing
and sequential randomization, which are generally unnecessary, and thus absent, in models
with perfect control. While our work focuses on the problem domain of routing, it appears
likely that these findings have analogues in other dynamic decision-making problems, as
well.
We begin with an informal description of the Anonymous Stochastic Routing model.
The decision maker is an agent who operates in discrete time and whose state in each time
period corresponds to a vertex in an undirected graph G. By traversing along the edges of
G, the agent’s main objective is to reach a goal vertex, D, drawn uniformly at random from
V. The agent’s performance is measured by the delay, defined as the expected number of
steps before she reaches the goal vertex for the first time. In the context of routing, the
agent can be thought of as a vessel (e.g., a data package containing encrypted information
or a physical vehicle) that traverses an underlying network G (e.g., a computer network or
physical transportation network) in order to deliver a package or item to a recipient, the
goal vertex. Crucially, the agent does not have perfect control over her trajectory due to
intrinsic uncertainty: in each time period, the agent may choose a vertex, v, among those
connected to her current state as her intended next step, which we refer to as her action.
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In the following period, her state becomes v with probability 1´ ε, and is set to a random
neighboring vertex, otherwise, where ε is the noise level which captures the degree of
intrinsic uncertainty in the environment.
The above routing model intends to capture the stochastic obstructions the agent faces
as she traverses the network, such as those induced by random link failures, non-cooperating
nodes, or traffic congestion. This model of uncertainty is the same as the stochastic routing
problem considered in Croucher (1978), which in turn is a special case of what has come
to be known as the stochastic shortest-path problem (Eaton and Zadeh 1962, Bertsekas
and Tsitsiklis 1991), which considers more general random shocks. We will explore more in
detail how such uncertainty manifests in some example applications in Section 1.3.
We now introduce the notion of anonymity. We assume that an overseeing adversary
obtains the entire actual trajectory traversed by the agent (but not her actions, which may
or may not have materialized), which may not necessarily terminate in the goal vertex D.
The objective of the adversary is to leverage this knowledge to predict the identity of D
among those vertices visited by the agent. If such a prediction can be performed with a
high-level of accuracy, then we say that the agent’s goal is not anonymous, and conversely,
if we can demonstrate that the adversary cannot come up with an accurate prediction, then
we say that the agent’s routing strategy affords a high level of anonymity.
Being wary of the adversary, the agent seeks a routing strategy that will minimize the
probability that the goal can be predicted by the adversary, which we refer to as the predic-
tion risk, subject to an upper bound on the delay. The agent thus faces a delay-anonymity
trade-off: on the one hand, she needs to employ randomization in her actions to obfuscate
the goal vertex, while on the other hand, excessive obfuscation could substantially increase
delay.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide near-optimal characterizations for the
fundamental trade-off between delay and prediction risk. At a high level, a main finding of
our paper is that, in the presence of intrinsic uncertainty, such trade-off takes on the form
prediction risk “ O
ˆ
1
delay´ cost of uncertainty
˙
. (1)
where “cost of uncertainty” is a term that increases as the level of uncertainty, ε, grows,
but does not depend on the delay budget. We establish trade-offs of this type in complete
graphs, linearly dense non-complete graphs that are generated by a random graph model,
and a family of sparse graphs, and show that they are achievable using a novel family
of routing strategies, the Water-Filling Strategies. Importantly, Eq. (1) shows that while
higher levels of intrinsic uncertainty will force the agent to incur longer delays, the additional
overhead is only additive.
To be clear, many assumptions in our model, such as the structure of the random shocks
or the prior distribution of the goal vertex, are stylized, and as such applying the strategies
we propose in an application would require caution and necessary modifications. However,
it appears that a rigorous study of the kind we carry out on how anonymous routing policies
perform in a stochastic environment will, at the least, yield valuable insights into the nature
of intrinsic uncertainty and help guide policy design in real-world systems.
1.1 Why does intrinsic uncertainty matter: stochastic versus de-
terministic routing
Before stating our main results, let us first provide some intuition as to
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1. why the presence of uncertainty fundamentally changes the nature of anonymous rout-
ing, and
2. why the additive overhead in Eq. (1) may not be trivial to obtain.
To this end, it is instructive to contrast our setup with one without any intrinsic uncer-
tainty. Our anonymous stochastic routing model is inspired by, and generalizes, the Goal
Prediction Game proposed in Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018). They consider the delay-anonymity
trade-off in a deterministic routing problem, where the agent has perfect control over her
trajectory, and prove that the optimal prediction risk scales inversely proportionally with
respect to the delay budget. The model in Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018) is therefore similar2 to
the noiseless special case of our model, by setting ε “ 0.
In light of the results in a noiseless setting, it is natural to ask whether only minor policy
modifications are needed in order to achieve desirable results in the presence of uncertainty.
The answer turns out to be negative, and we illustrate below why the policies will likely
need to be substantially redesigned.
It is shown in Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018) that in a deterministic routing setting, the
following family of meta-routing policies will achieve the optimal delay-anonymity trade-
off: upon seeing the goal vertex D, the agent generates a random path, S, and proceeds
to traverse the entirety of the path. Importantly, the path S includes, but not necessarily
terminates at, D, and the random mapping from D to S is carefully designed in such a way
that conditional on seeing the realized path S, the adversary has little idea as to which one
of the vertices therein is the true goal. Let us now take intrinsic uncertainty into account.
It is easy to show that because the agent can no longer exactly execute her routing actions,
it is not possible to implement the type of random path selection that was available in a
deterministic world. Instead, we can consider a natural adaptation of the policy: first, the
agent would randomly sample an “intended” path, S, as she would in a deterministic model.
Then, the agent would aim to traverse successive vertices in S using a certain stochastic-
shortest-path sub-routine. That is, the agent will try to first reach S1, and once that’s
achieved, try to reach S2, and so on.
One can show that this adapted algorithm will provide the same level of anonymity
guarantee as the original, because the vertices the agent touches between successive visits
to vertices in S are purely a result of the intrinsic uncertainty and are independent from
the goal vertex. Therefore, they do not provide additional information to the adversary.
Unfortunately, the bad news is that the delay cost incurred in executing the path S is now
substantially worse: it is not difficult to show that, due to uncertainty, it can take an average
of Ω
´
1
1´ε
¯
to Ω
´
1
1´2ε
¯
steps to execute just one step in the path S, depending on the
graph topology. In other words, the presence of uncertainty leads to a multiplicative increase
in delay, leading to a delay-anonymity trade-off of the form:
prediction risk “ O
ˆ
1
delayˆ cost of uncertainty
˙
, (2)
which, compared to Eq. (1), is significantly worse than the additive delay overhead under
an optimal policy.
2To be more precise, Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018) consider a different, online version of the problem, where
the adversary aims to predict the agent’s goal in real-time before it is reached, whereas in our application of
routing, such predictions are made offline after the agent’s routing actions have been completed. However,
the distinction between the online and offline formulations is in fact not significant, and the results are
generally mutually transferable.
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Harnessing intrinsic uncertainty, not fighting it. The above example illustrates that
naively enforcing a routing policy designed for a deterministic system can lead to orders of
magnitude worse performance in the presence of intrinsic uncertainty. A closer examination
of the example reveals a deeper root-cause of the inefficiencies: the agent can spend a
substantial fraction of the route in long excursions between reaching consecutive vertices on
the pre-planned path S, and since the adversary is aware of this fact, these excursions do
not meaningfully contribute to lowering the agent’s prediction risk. As a result, intrinsic
uncertainty only leads to an increase in delay, but not to better obfuscation.
A central insight of our work addresses this conundrum. Instead of pre-committing to
a path S and subsequently fighting against intrinsic uncertainty to implement it, we argue
that an efficient policy should leverage the randomness already present in the environment
and make it an integral part of the overall randomization. More concretely, this means that
the steps that the agent intentionally chooses and those that are a result of the intrinsic
uncertainty should be provably indistinguishable to the adversary; otherwise, the adversary
would be able to ignore the steps due to intrinsic uncertainty in his analysis and effectively
increase the prediction risk. Furthermore, because the realizations of the random shocks
are experienced by the agent in a sequential manner, it also suggests that the agent should
employ any artificial randomization in a sequential and adaptive manner that reacts to
the realizations of the random shocks, rather than deciding from the get-go when and how
to reach the target. The family of Water-Filling strategies that we propose in this paper
(Section 5) exploit the ideas of noise harnessing and sequential randomization. All of our
achievability results (i.e., upper bounds) are derived from variants of the Water-Filling
family.
1.2 Summary of Main Results
We now give an informal preview of our main results. The formal statements will be given
in Section 3. We will use n to denote the number of vertices in the network, and are mostly
interested in the regime where the network is large (nÑ8). Throughout, we fix the noise
level of the environment, ε, to be a value in p0, 1q.
1. Optimal trade-off in complete graphs (Theorem 1) We first consider the case where
the graph G is a complete graph. We provide a characterization of the trade-off between
delay and prediction risk, which is shown to be asymptotically tight as the graph size tends
to infinity. Recall that delay is the average number of steps it takes for the agent to reach
her goal. Denote by Qpwq the minimal prediction risk that can be achieved across all agent
strategies with a delay of at most w. Fix a delay target w ą ε2p1´εq2 ` 1. We show that, as
the graph size nÑ8,
Qpwq “ 1
2w ´ 1´ 12w´1 ¨ εp1´εq2 ´ βεpwq
` op1q, (3)
where βεpwq is a discrepancy term with |βεpwq| “ Oppε{wq2q, and the term op1q tends to 0
as nÑ8.
Some important observations can be made from Eq. (3). On the positive side, with
a carefully designed agent strategy, the intrinsic uncertainty leads only to an additive, as
opposed to multiplicative, delay overhead, whose magnitude is given by
cost of uncertainty “ 1
2w ´ 1 ¨
ε
1´ ε2 `Oppε{wq
2q. (4)
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As a result, the overhead becomes increasingly negligible as w grows. On the negative
side however, the lower bound portion of Eq. (3) shows that this cost of uncertainty can
never be fully eliminated or “absorbed”, even if the delay budget significantly surpasses the
(stochastic) diameter of the graph. The presence of uncertainty therefore always adversely
affects the agent compared to the noiseless setting.
2. Non-Complete graphs (Theorem 2) In many practical settings, the underlying network
topology may not be a complete graph. Fixing an average degree parameter p P p0, 1q, our
next result establishes that there exists a family of non-complete graphs, Gn, with average
degree pn, over which the intrinsic uncertainty still leads to an additive delay overhead. In
particular, we show that all graphs in Gn admit a minimal prediction risk obeying:
1
2w ` 1 ď Qpwq ď
1
2w ´
´
1
p ` εp1´εq2p
¯
` op1q
` op1q, (5)
for any graph in Gn, as n Ñ 8, whenever w ą ε2pp1´εq2 ` 1p . Furthermore, we show that
the family Gn is “large,” in the sense that a graph generated according to the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
model, Gpn, pq, belongs to Gn with high probability as nÑ8.
3. Designing sparse networks for anonymity (Theorem 3) The results so far focus
on instances where the network topology is treated as given. Unfortunately, the prediction
risk upper bound in Eq. (5) deteriorates as the graph becomes more sparse (p Ñ 0). To
understand what one can do in a sparse network topology, our next result considers the
scenario where the network structure can be designed, subject to an average degree con-
straint. Here, we show that there exists a sparse network structure that will offer similar
delay vs. prediction risk trade-off as that in a complete graph. For any degree sequence
tp¯nunPN, where ?n ! p¯n ď n,3 we show that there exists a family of graphs, G¯pn, p¯nq, where
each G P G¯pn, p¯nq has n vertices and average degree at most p¯n, over which the minimal
prediction risk satisfies
1
2w ` 1 ď Qpwq ď
1
2w ´ 1´ εp1´εq2
` op1q, (6)
as n Ñ 8, whenever w ą ε2p1´εq2 ` 1. Notably, thanks to the ability in choosing the
network topology, the prediction risk guarantee in Eq. (6) is stronger than that in Eq. (5),
for networks with the same level of sparsity, where asymptotically both the requirement on
w and the additive delay overhead are now independent of the average degree parameter p¯n.
1.3 Motivating Examples
We examine two application areas that motivate the formulation of the Anonymous Stochas-
tic Routing model proposed in this paper. While our model is clearly stylized and simplified
for direct application, we believe it captures key features of these applications and the the-
oretical findings reported in this work may provide valuable insights and design guidelines.
1.3.1 Anonymous Messaging
The anonymous routing model we propose can serve as a topology-aware framework for
studying anonymous messaging protocols, which enable Internet users to send messages
3We write fpnq ! gpnq if lim
nÑ8fpnq{gpnq “ 0.
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without revealing the identity of the receiver. A number of existing protocols, such as
Bitmessage (Warren (2012)), Riposte (Corrigan-Gibbs et al. (2015)), and Herbivore (Goel
et al. (2003)), ensure anonymity by flooding encrypted messages to a large number of nodes
in the network, while only the recipient node has the private key to decode the message.
The intention of the flooding is to ensure that any adversary who observes the network
traffic will have no way of knowing the intended recipient. However, uniformly flooding the
network with each message is not ideal: it can result in both excessive traffic congestion
when the network is large or sparse, and can create additional privacy risks by making it
easy for any malicious node to obtain a copy of all communications, even if encrypted.
To apply our model in this context, the agent would correspond to an encrypted data
packet that is being routed over a communication network. The vertices would represent
participating users and the edges the communication links between them. Our routing poli-
cies can be adapted into messaging protocols to achieve near-optimal congestion-anonymity
trade-off, in a manner that takes advantage of the underlying network structure and avoids
unnecessary flooding. Furthermore, our theoretical results would provide rigorous guaran-
tees for the performance of these protocols, which to the best of our knowledge, has not
been established for anonymous messaging protocols except for the case of uniform flooding.
Intrinsic uncertainty can manifest in anonymous messaging systems in two ways. First, due
to the inherent peer-to-peer nature of these systems, the communication links are subject to
random failures (cf. Perkins et al. (2001), Kurose and Ross (2013)), and participating users
may randomly become offline (Warren 2012). Second, a random fraction of the participating
users may be subject to malicious attacks (Vu et al. 2009) in which case they may not follow
the routing instruction prescribed by the protocol. The uncertainty model we propose here
can thus serve as a first-order approximation to the type of disruptions the data package
may encounter.
1.3.2 Obfuscation in Anonymity-Aware Logistics
Concerns over anonymity in routing can also arise in the physical world. With the advent of
machine learning, it has become increasingly easier for firms to collect and process data on
their competitors’ operations. For instance, investment firms have been able to use satellite
images of parking lots to estimate a retailer’s sales performance before such information is
made public (The Economist 2019). Such technologies are indeed not unique to the financial
industry; other AI-powered systems have also shown remarkable tracking abilities for cars
and ships (Rodriguez 2018, Allioux 2018).
Against this technological backdrop, we speculate that our model can potentially be used
to create interesting anonymity-aware logistic services. Imagine a firm, A, that regularly
receives shipment from a supplier for a certain vital material or component for manufacturing
its products. By tracking the timing, frequency and origination of the delivery trucks to
the firm’s plants, a competitor firm, B, may be able to infer the nature of the product or
its demand, both of which may be sensitive strategic information that A would want to
protect. To address this concern, a logistics company could conceivably offer an anonymity-
aware service to its clients: instead of sending a truck specifically designated for A each
time a shipment is ordered, the truck could potentially visit multiple recipients with similar
corporate profiles on a single delivery trip. From the perspective of firm A, over time, some
of the visits of the delivery truck indeed carry vital materials, while on other visits the
truck may simply be used for non-urgent supplies or pickups. When deployed strategically,
such obfuscation can make it difficult or impossible for a competitor to extract valuable
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information from analyzing the truck movement patterns.
In this context, the agent in our routing model would correspond to the delivery truck, the
network the physical road network, and the goal vertex the firm who is the true recipient of
the vital material for a particular delivery trip. Intrinsic uncertainty in this application can
be a result of unexpected traffic congestion or road disruptions due to weather conditions,
political demonstrations, or accidents. Admittedly, there are still large gaps to be bridged
in order for our model to be useful for logistical services in the real world. Nevertheless, it
could serve as a first step towards a conceptual framework for addressing anonymity issues
in logistics and transportation.
2 Model: Anonymous Stochastic Routing
In this section, we formally define our Anonymous Stochastic Routing model.
Model primitives. Let G “ pV, Eq be an undirected graph with n vertices. We consider
an agent who operates on the graph G in discrete time t P t1, . . . ,Ku, where K P N is the
time horizon. We denote the goal vertex by D, which is sampled uniformly at random from
V. In particular, the set of vertices V represents the states of the agent, and the set of edges
E the allowed state transitions in each period. We will denote by N pvq the neighborhood of
a vertex v: N pvq “ tv1 P V : pv, v1q P Eu. The initial state of the agent is given by x0 P V.
Our results will not depend on the distribution of x0 and without loss of generality, we may
assume that x0 is fixed.
We denote by ε the noise level in the system. Then, define a collection of i.i.d. Bernoulli
random variables tBtuKt“1 with success probability 1 ´ ε. The random variables tBtuKt“1
capture the intrinsic uncertainty in the system, where Bt indicates whether the agent’s
chosen action at time t will be fulfilled.
Finally, we define two mutually independent sequences of independent random variables
RA and RD. Specifically, RA and RD are independent random variables that can be used
for the purpose of randomization, by the agent or the adversary, respectively.
Agent trajectory and strategy. An agent trajectory is a sequence of random variables
tXtuKt“1 where Xt P V denotes the state of the agent at time t. We will denote by at the
action undertaken by the agent at time t, where at can be a neighboring vertex of the
agent’s current state Xt. Given at and Xt, the agent’s next state Xt`1 is generated as
follows. If Bt “ 1, then Xt`1 is equal to at, and if Bt “ 0, then Xt´1 is sampled uniformly
at random from the neighboring vertices. This dynamics is equivalent to the following
transition probabilities:
PpXt`1 “ v
ˇˇ
Xt “ xt, atq “
$’&’%
1´ ε` ε|N pxtq| , if v “ at,
ε
|N pxtq| , if v P N pxtqztatu,
0, otherwise.
More formally, the actions will be generated by an agent strategy, ψ, which is a sequence
of mappings that sequentially generates the agent’s actions, at “ ψtpHt,RA, Dq, where
Ht “ tpXi, ai, Biqut´1i“1 Y tXtu is the agent’s history up to time t.
Under any agent strategy ψ, the time at which the agent reaches the goal is referred to
as the goal-hitting time, and is given by
Tψ “ inftt ě 1 : Xt “ Du. (7)
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Then, the delay of agent strategy ψ is defined as EpTψq, where the expectation is taken
with respect to the randomness in D, RA and tBtuKt“1.
If by the end of the time horizon K the agent has not yet reached her goal, then at time
K ` 1, she is automatically sent to D and we say that the adversary succeeds. Specifically,
we set XK`1 “ D and assume BK “ 1. The use of a horizon is a primarily a technical
construction of the model to ensure the integrability of Tψ. For the most part, our analysis
will focus on cases where K is sufficiently large and has a negligible effect on the overall
system dynamics.
Adversary strategies and prediction risk. The adversary has access to G, x0,
RD, ψ and the agent’s entire trajectory tXtuKt“1. He does not observe the agent’s actual
actions tatuKt“1 and does not know whether the agent has reached her goal. Based on this
information, the adversary’s strategy, χ, produces a prediction Dˆχ in period K. Appendix
A provides an illustrative instance of the interaction between the agent and the adversary.
We say that the adversary succeeds if his prediction correctly matches the goal or if the
agent fails to reach her goal vertex by the end of the horizon. We define prediction risk of
a given pair of agent and adversary strategies pψ, χq as the probability
qpψ, χq “ PpDˆχ “ Dq ` PpTψ ą Kq, (8)
where the probability is measured with respect to the randomness in D,RA,RD, and
tBtuKt“1. Note that, for any fixed agent strategy ψ, the probability that the adversary
succeeds due to the agent’s failing to reach the goal by the end of the horizon diminishes as
the length of the horizon increases, i.e., lim
KÑ8PpT
ψ ą Kq “ 0. Hence, the main reason the
adversary succeeds will be due to his correct prediction of the goal vertex.
Minimax prediction risk. Given an agent strategy ψ, we define the maximal predic-
tion risk :
q˚pψq “ sup
χ
qpψ, χq. (9)
For any given time budget w P R`, Ψw is defined to be the set of all agent strategies for
which the delay is at most w: Ψw “ tψ : EpTψq ď wu.
Finally, we define our main metric of interest, the minimax prediction risk:
Qpwq “ inf
ψPΨw
q˚pψq “ inf
ψPΨw
sup
χ
qpψ, χq. (10)
In words, Qpwq measures the least amount of prediction risk that any agent strategy will
be able to guarantee subject to a delay of at most w. Characterizing Qpwq will allow us to
design efficient agent policies with limited resources, under uncertainty.
2.1 Notation
Let f, g : NÑ R be two functions. We use the following asymptotic notation: fpnq ! gpnq if
lim
nÑ8fpnq{gpnq “ 0; fpnq „ gpnq if limnÑ8fpnq{gpnq “ 1; fpnq ĺ gpnq if lim supnÑ8 fpnq{gpnq ă 8;
and fpnq ĺ1 gpnq if lim sup
nÑ8
fpnq{gpnq ď 1.
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3 Main Results
We state the main results in this section. The proofs will be given in Sections 9 and 10, with
an overview in Section 8. In the remainder, we fix a noise level ε P r0, 1q and a sequence of
horizons tKnunPN such that 1 ! Kn ! n.
The first theorem gives an asymptotically tight characterization of the prediction risk in
complete graphs. We focus on the large-graph asymptotic regime in which the number of
vertices, n, is let to approach infinity.
Theorem 1. Fix delay budget w such that w ą ε2p1´εq2 ` 1. Fix n P N, and let G “ pV, Eq
be a complete graph with n vertices. Then, the minimax prediction risk satisfies
1
2w ´ 1´ αεpwq ´ δn ď Qpwq ď
1
2w ´ 1´ αεpwq ´ βεpwq ` δn,
where lim
nÑ8 δn “ 0, and α
εpwq and βεpwq are defined by
αεpwq “ εp2w ´ 1qp1´ εq2 ą 0, and β
εpwq “ ε
2
2
`
w ´ 12
˘3 p1´ εq4 ą 0.
Notably, for large complete graphs, Theorem 1 establishes that the delay overhead due to
intrinsic uncertainty is only additive as a function of the noise level. Further, the overhead
is always strictly positive regardless the size of the delay budget.
Theorem 2 shows that there exists a family of non-complete graphs, Gn, with average
degree pn, on which an adaptive agent strategy guarantees an additive delay overhead. We
further prove that the family Gn is “large,” in the sense that an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph
with n vertices and edge probability p belongs to Gn with high probability, as nÑ8.
Theorem 2. Fix edge density p P r0, 1s and delay budget w ą 1p
´
ε
2p1´εq2 ` 1
¯
. Then, there
exists a sequence of families of graphs, tGnunPN, such that the following are true.
(a) Suppose that G˜ is a graph drawn from the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph model with n
vertices and edge probability p. Then,
PpG˜ P Gnq ě 1´ θn,
where lim
nÑ8 θn “ 0.
(b) Fix n P N, and suppose that G P Gn. Then, the minimax prediction risk satisfies
1
2w ` 1 ď Qpwq ď
1
2w ´ p´1p1` cεq ´ λn ` δn,
where δn and λn are constants that do not depend on G such that lim
nÑ8 δn “ 0, and limnÑ8λn “
0 hold, and cε “ εp1´εq2 .
Theorem 2 demonstrates that additive overhead on delay can still be achieved on a
“typical” non-complete graph, i.e., one that is generated by a random graph model with
linear edge density.
It is not difficult to formally extend Theorem 2 to a sparse regime and allow the density
of the graph, p, to diminish as n grows. Unfortunately, in this limit, the additive overhead
in the upper bound will tend to infinity at rate Ωp1{pq, rending the characterization rather
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weak. This limitation raises the question of whether we can still obtain desirable results in
sparse graphs, albeit with more structure. For instance, one could be in a setting where the
agent can design the network topology, subject to a constraint on the average degree. The
next theorem accomplishes this, showing that we can design networks with average degree as
low as
?
n, while maintaining a desirable prediction risk-delay trade-off that is competitive
even when compared to a complete graph; in Section 9.2, we explain how to design these
graphs explicitly.
Theorem 3. Fix a degree sequence tp¯nunPN such that p¯n ď n and p¯n " ?n. Fix n P N.
Then, there exists a family of graphs, G¯pn, p¯nq, consisting of graphs with n vertices and
average degree at most p¯n. Fix w such that w ą 1ρεn
´
ε
2p1´εq2 ` 1
¯
. Then, the minimax
prediction risk for this family satisfies
1
2w ` 1 ď Qpwq ď
1
2wρεn ´ 1´ cε ` δn,
where lim
nÑ8 ρ
ε
n “ 1 and lim
nÑ8 δn “ 0, and c
ε “ εp1´εq2 .
Contrasting Theorems 2 and 3, we see that the ability to design the topology allows the
agent to achieve superior anonymity guarantees on graphs of similar edge density. First,
the leading constant in front of w in the upper bound of Theorem 3 matches that of the
lower bound, whereas that of Theorem 2 does not. More interestingly, while both results
demonstrate an additive delay overhead due to uncertainty, the overhead in Theorems 3
is independent of the graph’s average degree p¯n (provided that p¯n " ?n), whereas the
overhead in Theorem 2 deteriorates as the average degree decreases.
4 Related Work
The Anonymous Stochastic Routing model is inspired by, and generalizes, the Goal Pre-
diction Game proposed by Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018), who showed that, in a deterministic
anonymous path-planning model, the agent’s prediction risk is inversely proportional to her
delay in undirected graphs with a small diameter. Our model diverges from Tsitsiklis and
Xu (2018) in two primary ways. First and foremost, our formulation overcomes a crucial
limitation of the model in Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018) by allowing the agent’s actual trajectory
to be perturbed by noise and uncertainty. This distinction is significant, since as explained
in Section 1.1, the incorporation of intrinsic uncertainty requires a fundamentally different
approach to policy design than in the deterministic setting. Secondly, the model in Tsit-
siklis and Xu (2018) focuses more on applications in sequential planning and thus considers
an online adversary who makes prediction in real-time and aims to predict the goal before
the agent reaches it, whereas we are mostly interested in modeling a passive data collector
and allow the adversary to make offline predictions, after the agent’s routing actions have
already been completed. In this way, the adversary model in our formulation is more pow-
erful. However, we do not expect this second difference to be significant, and most of our
results and those of Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018) can be derived in both settings, with possible
changes in the leading constant of the prediction risk bounds.
Anonymity in routing or messaging has been extensively studied in the computer science
literature (Reiter and Rubin 1998, Corrigan-Gibbs and Ford 2010, Fanti et al. 2015, Luo
et al. 2016, Kwon et al. 2017). Models in this literature vary depending on whether the
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algorithm protects the anonymity of the sender or receiver, and on the strength of adversarial
assumption (e.g., local versus global adversary). In the context of this literature, we focus
on receiver anonymity, under a global adversary who can observe all routing traffic in the
system, and provide information theoretic anonymity guarantees that do not depend on
cryptographic or computational hardness assumptions. In this way, our work is distinct
from those that study sender anonymity (e.g., Fanti et al. (2015), Luo et al. (2016)), assume
local adversaries who only observe the traffic over a subset of the network (e.g., Reiter
and Rubin (1998), Tang et al. (2020)) or require encryption to prevent the adversary from
eavesdropping on the message’s destination (e.g., Dingledine et al. (2004)). There have
been systems proposed that, like ours, also provide receiver anonymity against a global
adversary, but they require the presence of a central server to collect and shuffle messages
(e.g., Corrigan-Gibbs et al. (2015)). As mentioned in Section 1.3, existing peer-to-peer
protocols that do not require a central server mostly rely on broadcasting each (encrypted)
message to all members of a group (Goel et al. 2003, Corrigan-Gibbs and Ford 2010, Warren
2012), leading to sub-optimal network congestion, especially in sparse networks. Finally, we
are not aware of any existing model or protocol that provides formal anonymity guarantees
in the presence of intrinsic uncertainty as in the present paper.
At a higher level, our work relates to a growing literature on anonymity-preserving
mechanisms in sequential (rather than static) decision-making, including those in operations
research (cf. Cummings et al. (2016), Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018)), game theory (cf. Blum
et al. (2015), Gradwohl and Smorodinsky (2017), Augenblick and Bodoh-Creed (2018)),
computer science (cf. Fanti et al. (2015), Lindell and Pinkas (2009)) and learning theory
(cf. Calmon et al. (2015), Shokri and Shmatikov (2015), Tossou and Dimitrakakis (2016),
Xu (2018), Tsitsiklis et al. (2018)). Similar to our model, most of the existing algorithms
rely on injecting artificial randomness into the agent’s decision-making policy to achieve
obfuscation. However, unlike in our model, to the best of our knowledge, almost all existing
models consider the noiseless setting where the agent has full control of the effects of her
actions. In contrast, the agent’s actions in our model are subject to random shocks and
perturbations, which makes efficient obfuscation substantially more difficult.
More broadly, our model is related, in spirit, to the literature on differential privacy
(Dwork 2008, Dwork and Roth 2014), in that both are interested in providing information-
theoretic guarantees on protecting sensitive information against a sophisticated adversary.
However, our model is not comparable to the differential privacy paradigm: they are mostly
concerned with privatizing datasets that consist of multiple individuals, and the main goal
there is to make sure that an algorithm running on two datasets that differ by one individual
entry does not lead to obviously diverging outputs (i.e., a “differential” perturbation). The
notions of multiple individuals or differential perturbation have no close analog in our setting.
5 Water-Filling Strategies
We describe in this section the family of Water-Filling Strategies which will form the foun-
dation of our analysis. All upper bounds in our theorems are proved by analyzing an agent
that employs a variant of the Water-Filling Strategy, and the lower bound in Theorem 1 also
relies on insights derived from this family. To simplify terminology, we define the following
two meta actions to serve as a short-hand encoding for the agent’s actual actions:
(1) We say that the agent chooses the Random-Step meta action (a¯R), if she samples a
vertex uniformly at random from the set of neighboring vertices of her current state,
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i.e. at „ UnifpN pXtqq.
(2) We say that the agent chooses the Goal-Attempt meta action (a¯G), if the agent
chooses the goal vertex D as her action, i.e., at “ D. The agent can choose this action
only if the goal vertex is in her immediate neighborhood.
We will denote by A¯ “ ta¯R, a¯Gu the set of meta actions, and by a¯t P A¯ the meta action
taken at time t.
We will make repeated use of the concept of intentional goal-hitting time, defined as the
first time the goal is reached by the agent intentionally via a successful Goal-Attempt meta
action, as opposed to reaching the goal coincidentally via a random shock: 4
TIH “ inftt ě 1 : agent chooses Goal-Attempt at t´ 1 and Bt´1 “ 1u. (11)
The intentional goal-hitting time serves as a natural upper bound on the actual goal-hitting
time, but is more amenable to analysis.
We are now ready to define the Water-Filling Strategies. Define the counter Lptq to be
the number of times the state X has visited the neighborhood of the goal vertex, N pDq, by
time t:
Lptq “
tÿ
s“1
IpXs P N pDqq. (12)
We will denote by TwfIH the intentional goal-hitting time under this family of strategies.
Definition 1 (Water-Filling Strategy). Fix a target risk level q¯ P r0, 1s. Let G “ pV, Eq be
a connected undirected graph with n vertices. Define a threshold5
t˚ “
R
1
q¯
´ ε
1´ ε
V
.
and a sequence of probabilities indexed by t:
pt “
#
q¯
1´ε p1´ tq¯q´1 , if 0 ď t ă t˚ ´ 1,
1, otherwise.
(13)
The Water-Filling Strategy, ψwfq¯ , is defined as follows: for t P N
1. If Xt P N pDq (agent in the neighborhood of goal vertex) and TwfIH ą t (no intentional
goal-hitting so far):
(1) with probability pLptq, the agent chooses the Goal-Attempt meta action, where
Lptq and tptutPN were defined in Eqs. (12) and(13), respectively;
(2) otherwise, the agent chooses the Random-Step meta action.
2. If Xt R N pDq or TwfIH ď t, the agent always chooses the Random-Step meta action.
4Note that TIH ď K ` 1: if the agent has not yet reached her goal by the end of the horizon, then we
have TIH “ K ` 1 since we set XK`1 “ D and BK “ 1.
5To simplify notation and to avoid floor and ceiling functions, we will henceforth assume the parameters
are such that 1
q¯
´ ε
1´ε is an integer.
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In words, under the Water-Filling Strategy, the agent always performs a Random-Step
meta action when she is not in the immediate neighborhood of the goal vertex. Other-
wise, she will attempt to reach the goal with a probability that depends on the level of
intrinsic uncertainty, ε, as well as how many times she has already visited the goal vertex’s
neighborhood, Lptq.
To deploy the Water-Filling Strategy for different delay budgets, it suffices to vary the
risk level q¯ until a desirable delay is achieved: as we will formally show in the subsequent
sections, larger q¯ leads to shorter delays, and vice versa.
5.1 Interpretation of Water-Filling Strategy
We now explain the intuition behind the Water-Filling Strategy, and how it addresses the
design principles outlined in Section 1.1. At a high level, the Water-Filling Strategy aims
to achieve the following objectives:
1. Independence between trajectory and goal-hitting time. Since the adversary observes
the entire trajectory, predicting the identity of the goal vertex is equivalent to correctly
predicting the goal-hitting time (Eq. (7)). Therefore, to be able to accurately control
the adversary’s ability to predict the goal-hitting time, the Water-Filling Strategy
ensures that the goal-hitting time is (approximately) independent from the agent’s
trajectory. This independence, if true, reduces the analysis of the prediction risk to
that of the probability mass function (PMF) of the goal-hitting time, thus simplifying
the analysis.
The Water-Filling Strategy achieves this independence via carefully chosen meta ac-
tions. It is essential that the strategy only chooses to approach the goal vertex when
Xt is in the goal’s immediate neighborhood. This ensures the needed symmetry in
the trajectory, since the adversary has no way of knowing whether a single move is
reaching the goal vertex or just a random step. Moreover, besides this Goal-Attempt
meta action, the agent’s action in all other times, Random-Step, is clearly independent
from the goal vertex.
2. Flattening the PMF of goal-hitting time, while minimizing delay : Once the above-
mentioned independence is established, the next task is to ensure that the maximum
value of the PMF of the goal-hitting time is small. Moreover, we also need to ensure
that while doing so, delay is minimized subject to a level of prediction risk.
This is the part where the Water-Filling Strategy employs sequential randomization,
as eluded to in Section 1.1. To see how this works, it is easiest to consider the special
case where the network G is a complete graph. In this case, Xt is essentially always in
N pDq prior to the intentional goal-hitting time, and the Water-Filling Strategy will
direct the agent to choose Goal-Attempt with progressively smaller probability, pt,
until the goal vertex is reached, in the form of Eq. (13). The particular values of pt
are chosen in such a way that
paq the PMF of the intentional goal-hitting time TwfIH never exceeds the risk level q¯,
and
pbq given paq is satisfied, they minimize the resulting expected value of TwfIH .
In particular, pbq is achieved by greedily shifting the probability mass of TwfIH towards
small t. This is what leads to the name-sake “Water-Filling”: treating each entry of
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the PMF of TwfIH as a bucket, the strategy is essentially trying to fill the buckets with
small t up to the risk level q¯, until it’s no longer possible to do so due to the presence
of intrinsic uncertainty (beyond the threshold t˚).6 Figure 1 provides an illustration of
this type of intentional goal-hitting time PMF induced by the Water-Filling Strategy
on a complete graph.
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Figure 1: Distribution of TwfIH under the Water-Filling Strategy, with q¯ “ 0.21 and ε “ 0.5
on a complete graph. The vertical line depicts the threshold t˚.
When the graph is not complete, the agent is clearly not able to choose the Goal-
Attempt meta action if she is not in the goal vertex’s neighborhood, and in this case,
the Water-Filling Strategy simply lets the agent take a Random-Step meta action. Our
choice to employ the Random-Step is based on the following insight: the adversary
does not observe the agent’s actions, and as a result, under a carefully designed policy,
he cannot distinguish a Random-Step from a Goal-Attempt purely based on the result-
ing trajectory. This feature ensures that the Water-Filling Strategy can continue to
achieve a near-optimal prediction risk for a given level of delay, though, unfortunately,
the minimum delay that can be implemented under a Water-Filling Strategy will be
higher when the network is sparser.
The sequential randomization employed by the Water-Filling Strategy also highlights the
distinction between environments with and without intrinsic uncertainty: in a deterministic
system, there is little benefit to sequential randomization because the agent can perform
randomization before routing begins and she will be sure as to when and how the goal vertex
will be reached. Under intrinsic uncertainty, however, because the agent could not have
foreseen with certainty when the goal vertex could be reached, the Water-Filling Strategy
must tune the probability of Goal-Attempt in an adaptive manner, depending on whether
a Goal-Attempt action has already succeeded in the past. For instance, it is easy to show
that if the agent does not promptly switch to Random-Step after TwfIH but continues to
choose Goal-Attempt, then the goal vertex D would tend to be over-represented in the final
trajectory, leading to a sub-optimal delay vs. prediction risk trade-off. Note also that the
magnitudes of pt (or rather 1´pt), which correspond to the degree of artificial randomization
the agent injects, depend on the noise level ε from the intrinsic uncertainty. This is how the
Water-Filling Strategy harnesses intrinsic uncertainty, and thus avoids unnecessarily large
delays.
6In the special case of a deterministic system with ε “ 0, this water-filling procedure in fact leads to a
sequential construction of the random variable TwfIH that is uniformly distributed between 1 and t
˚.
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6 Numerical Experiments
While our theoretical results focus on the anonymity vs. delay trade-off in the large-graph
asymptotic, in this section we present some numerical examples and simulations on finite
graphs with a modest size. We simulate an agent running a Water-Filling Strategy with
q¯ “ 12w´1´cε , where cε “ εp1´εq2 , for a range of delay budget values, w. For simplicity, we
will assume that the adversary predicts the goal vertex to be the first vertex after the initial
vertex along the trajectory. This adversary estimator is an optimal MAP estimator against
the Water-Filling strategy in a complete graph, but not necessarily optimal for non-complete
graphs. Nevertheless, since the trajectory under Water-Filling Strategy has been shown to
be independent of the goal, and the distribution of its goal-hitting time is non-increasing
in time by design, this estimator should give us a reasonable approximation of the optimal
prediction risk.
5 10 15 20 25 30
Delay
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
Pr
ed
ict
io
n 
ris
k
= 0.3, p = 1
Water-Filling
ASB
Lower Bound
Asymptotic tradeoff
5 10 15 20 25 30
Delay
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
Pr
ed
ict
io
n 
ris
k
= 0.7, p = 1
Water-Filling
ASB
Lower Bound
Asymptotic tradeoff
Figure 2: An illustration of the prediction risk as a function of the delay on a complete
graph with n “ 100 vertices, under noise level ε “ 0.1 and 0.3, respectively.
We first study a complete graph with n “ 100 vertices (Figure 2). For each delay
budget value, we compute the prediction risk and the delay by averaging over 105 trajectory
realizations. Finally, we plot the asymptotic characterization of the delay-prediction trade-
off in Theorem 1, which holds as n Ñ 8, as well as the looser lower bound in Theorem
2 which holds for any graph of any size. For comparison, we also include an estimated
prediction risk for a more naive agent strategy, described in Section 1.1. The strategy,
dubbed adapted segment-based strategy (ASB), serves as a proxy of what one may have
obtained had they tried to implement a routing strategy designed for a deterministic model
in an environment with uncertainty. Specifically, we consider the family of segment-based
strategies in Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018) and assume that the agent first randomly selects
an intended path, and subsequently traverses adjacent vertices along this path using a
stochastic-shortest-path sub-routine. As discussed in Section 1.1, in a large complete graph,
the overhead for traversing any particular pre-selected vertices takes on average 11´ε steps,
and the prediction risk can be analytically computed accordingly.
The figures show that our bounds offer reasonably good approximates for a finite graph
with moderate size. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the performance of ASB and
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the Water-Filling Strategy is relatively small at a low noise level, but becomes much more
pronounced as the noise level increases. This is to be expected since the ASB suffers a
multiplicative overhead in delay due to increased uncertainty and hence its prediction risk
is more sensitive to the changes in the noise level. Similarly, we observe that as ε increases,
the prediction risk also increases for any delay budget since the agent is required to choose
higher q¯ values to ensure similar delay values. Finally, there persists a small gap between
the simulated curve as the asymptotic trade-off predicted by Theroem 1. We expect this
to be largely due to the finite size of the graph. Figure 3 shows that, as we increase the
network size, the simulated prediction risk tends to converge towards that of the asymptotic
trade-off curve.
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Figure 3: Comparison of the prediction risks on a complete graph at different network sizes,
with ε “ 0.3. Here we zoom into a smaller section of the delays for better visual clarity.
In Figure 4, we turn to non-complete graphs and repeat our analysis on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random graphs with 100 vertices and edge density p “ 0.8. For each delay budget value,
we compute the prediction risk and the delay by averaging over 100 trajectory realizations,
100 graph instances and 100 goal vertices. Since we do not have a matching asymptotic
lower bound for this case, we will display only the upper bound from Theorem 2, which
is likely not tight. Since the delay under an ASB strategy is more difficult to estimate
here, we will use some more optimistic estimates (in favor of ASB). We will assume that
each step takes on average 1pp1´εq steps to traverse between two adjacent vertices on the
pre-selected path. This is based on the calculation that for a typical vertex in such a graph,
the agent has roughly a probability of p of being directly connected to the vertex she wishes
to reach, and each attempt to reach it will succeed with probability 1 ´ ε. Figure 4 shows
that, compared to the simulations on the complete graph, the bounds in these non-complete
graphs are less tight, and with an increased noise level, the upper bound appears to be more
pessimistic in the regime of small delays. The performance gap between Water-Filling and
the ASB strategy tends to widen even more, and this appears to be due to the fact that the
multiplicative delay overhead associated with ASB increases as p decreases.
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Figure 4: An illustration of the prediction risk as a function of the delay on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random graphs with n “ 100 vertices and edge density p “ 0.8, under noise level ε “ 0.1
and 0.3, respectively.
7 Discussion
There is a number of interesting directions for future research. A limitation of the Water-
Filling Strategy is that it cannot enforce a small delay when the network is very sparse,
which is due to the fact that the agent does not try to intentionally move closer to the goal
unless she is already in its immediate neighborhood. While a variant of the strategy used
in Theorem 3 does address this issue in sparse networks by exploiting a clique structure,
this puts additional constraints on the type of networks. An interesting direction would be
to understand whether one can design a routing strategy that simultaneously delivers low
delay and optimal anonymity-delay trade-off in sparse networks, without requiring strong
assumptions on the network topology. In another direction, it would be interesting to extend
this model to the setting with multiple rounds of routing tasks: our strategy may fail if the
recipients across rounds can be correlated, if, for instance, the adversary focuses on the
vertices that are shared across different rounds of routing trajectories. A solution to this
problem may require some form of buffering and shuffling of goal vertices across the rounds,
so as to erase any correlation structure, which is similar to the approaches of centralized
anonymous messaging systems such as Corrigan-Gibbs et al. (2015).
Our investigation also reveals an intriguing conceptual puzzle concerning the interplay
between the sparsity of the network and the ease of obfuscation. While in many centralized
routing problems the performance of the system only improves with denser networks, this is
not so obvious in the case of stochastic anonymous routing. The lower bounds in Theorems
2 and 3 turn out to be weaker than the one we have for the complete graph in Theorem
1. This is counter-intuitive, since one would expect that having more edges in the network
helps the agent, and therefore, at the very least, the lower bound for the complete graph
should extend to graphs that are strictly more sparse. However, this apparent monotonicity
turns out to be far from obvious: on the one hand, adding edges should make it easier for the
agent to traverse the graph, but at the same time it also makes it possible for random shocks
to throw the agent off in ways that were not previously possible. Note that in a deterministic
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setting with ε “ 0, a denser graph always helps the agent (since she can simply choose to
ignore certain edges), which suggests that the puzzle is a direct consequence of intrinsic
uncertainty.
8 Proof Overview
The next two sections are devoted to the proofs of the main theorems. The upper bounds
are proved in Section 9, and our proofs will be based on analyzing the delay and prediction
risk experienced by an agent who employs a Water-Filling type strategy: the bounds in
Theorems 1 and 2 are directly based on the strategy outlined in Definition 1. The proof of
the upper bound in Theorem 3 uses a variant of the Water-Filling Strategy that is adapted
to exploit a clique-like structure in the network to obtain even smaller delays. The primary
techniques used here are concentration inequalities for random graph asymptotics, combined
with the independence property outlined in Section 5.1.
The lower bounds are proved in Section 10. For the lower bound in Theorem 1 (complete
graphs), we leverage the “water-filling” analogy in Section 5.1 and show that the Water-
Filling Strategy by construction induces an intentional goal-hitting time with the minimum
expected delay, across all possible strategies that yield a maximum risk level of q¯. We then
use the large-graph asymptotics to show that the expected intentional goal-hitting time
coincides with the true delay as n Ñ 8. Unfortunately, this more delicate line of analysis
does not extend to more complex topologies of the graphs in Theorems 2 and 3. In those
cases, we will use a reduction argument to extend a prediction risk lower bound proved in
Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018) for a noiseless model to our setting.
9 Proofs of Upper Bounds
9.1 Upper Bounds in Theorems 1 and 2
We prove in this subsection the upper bounds in Theorems 1 and 2, using the Water-Filling
Strategies. We begin by introducing the two main technical results which will form the
foundation of the proofs. Both results concern the performance of an agent that uses the
Water-Filling Strategy outlined in Definition 1:
1. Proposition 1 establishes an upper bound on the delay as a function of the risk level
q¯, noise level ε, and a parameter p that captures the edge density of the network G.
2. Proposition 2 establishes an upper bound on the maximal prediction risk that only
depends on the target risk level q¯, as well as the maximum and minimum degrees of
G. In particular, it does not depend on ε, nor any other topological properties of G.
We will then combine these technical results to get the upper bounds in Theorems 1 and 2.
To ensure that the delay under the Water-Filling Strategy is not too large, we will
rely on the following Neighborhood Overlap property, which essentially states that pairs of
connected nodes share a large fraction of overlapping neighbors. Intuitively, this condition
ensures that a random walk over the graph will frequently visit some neighboring vertex of
the goal vertex, though not necessarily the goal vertex itself.
Definition 2 (Neighborhood Overlap). Fix p P r0, 1s. G “ pV, Eq satisfies the Neighbor-
hood Overlap property with parameter p, if for any pair u, v P V, at least p fraction of the
neighborhood of v intersects the neighborhood of u, i.e.,
ˇˇN puq XN pvq ˇˇ { ˇˇN pvq ˇˇ ě p.
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Now, we state Proposition 1 which derives an upper bound on the expected delay under
the Water-Filling Strategy on any graph with the Neighborhood Overlap property. Notably,
we can see that the impact of the noise level ε on the delay is additive. Proposition 1 is
proven in Section 9.3.1, using the expected intentional goal-hitting time as a natural upper
bound on the actual goal-hitting time.
Proposition 1. Fix graph size n P N, and target risk level q¯ P r0, 1s. Let G “ pV, Eq be a
graph with
ˇˇV ˇˇ “ n. Suppose G satisfies the Neighborhood Overlap property with parameter
p. Under the Water-Filling Strategy, ψwfq¯ , the expected delay satisfies
EpT q ď EpTIHq ď 1
p
ˆ
1
2q¯
` 1
2
` q¯ε
2p1´ εq2
˙
.
Next, we state an upper bound on the maximal prediction risk under the Water-Filling
Strategy on any undirected connected graph. Proposition 2 expresses the maximal prediction
risk in terms of the target risk level, q¯. The result shows that the maximal prediction risk
under the Water-Filling Strategy depends on the graph topology only through the minimum
and maximum degrees of the vertices. The proof is given in Section 9.3.2.
Proposition 2. Fix graph size n P N, and target risk level q¯ P r0, 1s. Let G “ pV, Eq be
a graph with |V| “ n. Under the Water-Filling Strategy, ψwfq¯ , the maximal prediction risk
satisfies
q˚pψwfq¯ q ď q¯∆Gn ` δ
1
n
where δ1n “ wKn ` 1 ´
´
1´ 1∆G
¯Kn
, lim
nÑ8 δ
1
n “ 0, and ∆G and ∆G are the minimum and
maximum degrees of G, i.e., ∆G “ min
vPV |N pvq| and ∆G “ maxvPV |N pvq|.
We now combine Propositions 1 and 2 to derive an upper bound on the minimax pre-
diction risk, as a function of the delay target, w. Let
cε “ εp1´ εq2 , (14)
and suppose w ą cε2 `1 holds. By Proposition 1, to obtain EpT q ď w under the Water-Filling
Strategy with target risk level q¯, it suffices to set
q¯ “ 1
2wp´ 1´ cε . (15)
Next, we note that the minimax prediction risk Qpwq is upper bounded by the maximal
prediction risk under any strategy whose expected delay is at most w. Specifically, we
can look at the Water-Filling Strategy whose target risk level is given by Eq. (15). Then,
Proposition 2 implies
Qpwq ď q˚pψwfq¯ q ď q¯∆Gn ` δ
1
n “
∆G
n
2wp´ 1´ cε ` δ
1
n. (16)
We can then substitute ∆G, ∆G, and p to obtain an upper bound on the minimax prediction
risk on different network topologies. We present the derivation of these upper bounds in
Theorems 1 and 2 in the following subsections.
20
9.1.1 Complete Graphs: Theorem 1
We first note that on a complete graph we have ∆G “ ∆G “ n and the Neighborhood
Overlap property holds with parameter p “ 1. Using Eq. (16), this immediately implies
that for any delay budget w such that w ą ε2p1´εq2 ` 1 holds, the minimax prediction risk
satisfies
Qpwq ď 1
2w ´ 1´ cε ` δ
1
n. (17)
This already shows that a delay overhead that is only additive in ε can be achieved via the
Water-Filling Strategy.
To obtain the exact additive overhead, we can conduct a more refined analysis. In
what follows, we will derive a prediction risk upper bound that improves upon Eq. (17),
leading to the upper bound in Theorem 1. Fix a delay budget w and consider the class
of strategies, Φw, under which the expected intentional goal-hitting time is at most w, i.e.,
Φw “ tψ : EpTψIH q ď wu. Define q¯pwq to be the minimum target risk level q¯ that can be
attained by a Water-Filling Strategy with expected intentional goal-hitting time at most
w, that is, q¯pwq “ inftq¯ : Dψwfq¯ P Φwu. Suppose w ą ε2p1´εq2 ` 1 holds. Proposition
1 implies that the expected intentional goal-hitting time on a complete graph is at most
1
2q¯ ` 12 ` q¯ε2p1´εq2 . This shows that q¯pwq satisfies:
q¯pwq ď 1`
w ´ 12
˘ˆ
1`b1´ εpw´ 12 q2p1´εq2
˙ . (18)
Let x “ εpw´ 12 q2p1´εq2 . By the Taylor expansion of
?
1´ x for x ă 1, we have that
q¯pwq ď 1
2w ´ 1´ αεpwq ´ βεpwq , (19)
where αεpwq “ εp2w´1qp1´εq2 and βεpwq “ ε
2
2pw´ 12 q3p1´εq4 .
Finally, we recall that setting q¯ “ q¯pwq implies EpTwf q ď EpTwfIH q ď w. Hence, we use
Proposition 2 and Eq. (19) to obtain
Qpwq ď 1
2w ´ 1´ αεpwq ´ βεpwq ` δ
1
n. (20)
This concludes the proof of the upper bound in Theorem 1. ˝
9.1.2 Family Gn: Theorem 2
We now turn to the proof of the upper bound in Theorem 2 and show that an additive
delay overhead can still be attained on a family of non-complete graphs. In Definition
3, we formally define a parameterized family of graphs Fnpp, γq with concentrated degree
distribution and Neighborhood Overlap property, which ensure that the prediction risk is
low and the delay is small. Then, we prove that an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with n
vertices and edge density p belongs to the family Fnpp, γnq with high probability as nÑ8.
In a way, this suggests that “typical” graphs with average degree pn under the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
model still enjoy low minimax prediction risk as was the case in complete graphs. Finally,
we use Eq. (16) to conclude the upper bound.
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Definition 3 (Family Fnpp, γq of Graphs). Fix p P r0, 1s and γ P r0, 1s. For each n P N, we
define Fnpp, γq as the set of all graphs G “ pV, Eq with n vertices such that (1) the degrees
of all vertices are upper- and lower-bounded by pnp1`γq and pnp1´γq respectively, and (2)
the Neighborhood Overlap property holds with parameter pp1´ γq.
Next, we will set the value of γ in Fnpp, γq to define our main object of interest, the
sequence of families tGnppqunPN.
Definition 4 (Family Gnppq of Graphs). Fix p P r0, 1s. Let tγnunPN be a sequence such that
γn P r0, 12 s, γn "
a
log n{n and lim
nÑ8 γn “ 0. For each n P N, we define Gnppq “ Fnpp, γnq.
In the remainder, we will restrict our focus on the family Gnppq where γn is defined as
in Definition 4. Recall that under the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph model, a graph with n
vertices is constructed by independently connecting each pair of vertices by an edge with
probability p. Lemma 1 shows that with high probability, a graph generated using the
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph model with edge probability p belongs to the family Gnppq. The
proof relies on an application of concentration inequalities and is given in Appendix C.1.
We note that Lemma 1 proves Theorem 2(a).
Lemma 1. Fix edge density p P r0, 1s. Fix graph size n P N and consider the family of
graphs Gnppq. Let G be an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with n vertices and edge probability
p. Then, there exists a sequence tθnunPN, with lim
nÑ8 θn “ 0, such that for every n P N,
PpG P Gnppqq ě 1´ θn holds.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 2(b) and use Eq. (16). Assume that w ą 1p `
ε
2pp1´εq2 holds. We then substitute the Neighborhood Overlap parameter p “ pp1´γnq, and
the minimum and maximum degrees ∆G “ pnp1 ´ γnq and ∆G “ pnp1 ` γnq. Thus, we
obtain
Qpwq ď pp1` γnq
2wpp1´ γnq ´ 1´ cε ` δ
1
n “ 12w ´ 1p p1` cεq ´ 2γnw
` γn
2wpp1´ γnq ´ 1´ cε ` δ
1
n,
where δ1n “ 1´
´
1´ 1pnp1´γnq
¯Kn` wKn . Let δn “ δ1n` γn2wpp1´γnq´1´cε and λn “ 2γnn. Recall
that for the family Gnppq with γ “ γn, we have lim
nÑ8 γn “ 0. Therefore, the second term
in δn will approach 0 as n Ñ 8. Similarly, we have lim
nÑ8λn “ 0. Next, let us consider δ
1
n.
Since w is fixed and does not depend on n, and since Kn ! n by assumption, we also have
lim
nÑ8 δ
1
n “ 0. Thus, we conclude lim
nÑ8 δn “ 0. Finally, we get Qpwq ď
1
2w´p´1p1`cεq´λn ` δn
where lim
nÑ8 δn “ 0. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. ˝
Note that as we let n and K grow, the upper bound becomes
Qpwq ď 1
2w ´ 1p ´ εp1´εq2p
,
showing that an additive uncertainty overhead is still achievable, even when the graph is
generated from a random graph model. However, the performance deteriorates as pÑ 0.
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9.2 Upper Bound in Theorem 3
In this section, we prove the upper bound in Theorem 3 and analyze what one can achieve
by selecting a sparse network topology. The proof of Theorem 3 consists of three main steps.
First, we describe a family of networks G¯pn, p¯nq, having n vertices and average degree at
most p¯n.
The main insight is to build a graph composed of several highly connected components
that are connected to each other via a small number of edges; as such, each connected com-
ponent functions as a complete graph, and the time to travel between different components
is small. Next, we design the Clique Water-Filling Strategy to be applied on G¯pn, p¯nq and
quantify its delay as a function of the delay of ψwfq¯ on a complete graph. To do so, we use
a coupling argument in which we “freeze” time whenever the agent leaves the component
containing her goal. Finally, we derive an upper bound on the prediction risk using a re-
duction argument to the complete graph setting. Specifically, we observe that if the agent
announces which component contains her goal, then the adversary can ignore the rest of
the graph and focus only on the announced component. Since this component is itself a
complete graph, the maximum prediction risk under ψwfq¯ applies as an upper bound. We
note that the graphs and the strategy developed in this subsection generalize the complete
graphs and the Water-Filling Strategy, respectively.
We start with the following definition that constructs the graph G with the desired
properties: We first create k fully connected cliques with size m each. Then, we connect the
lth vertex in the cliques to one another, for each l “ 1, . . . ,m. A sample k-clique graph is
illustrated in Appendix B.
Definition 5 (k-Clique Graph). Fix n, k P N, and denote m “ nk . Let G “ pV, Eq be a
k-clique graph with n vertices. Then, G is constructed as follows.
(1) For each i P t1, ..., ku, construct a complete graph Gi “ pVi, Eiq where Vi “ tvi1, . . . , vimu.
(2) Define E˜ “ tpvil , vjl q : 1 ď i ă j ď k, 1 ď l ď mu.
(3) Let V “ Ťki“1 Vi and E “ E˜ Y pŤki“1 Eiq.
(4) Set G “ pV, Eq so that |V| “ n and |E | “ n2
`
n
k ` k ´ 1
˘
.
Under this construction, each vertex has degree nk ` k´ 1, with nk within the clique and
k ´ 1 across cliques. Note that if the average degree of the network is constrained to be
at most p¯n, then one can choose the number of cliques, k, so as to have
n
k ` k ´ 1 ď p¯n.
Therefore, we let G¯pn, p¯nq be the family of k-clique graphs where k satisfies nk ` k´ 1 ď p¯n.
Next, adapting the Water-Filling Strategy to leverage the network structure, we design
the Clique Water-Filling Strategy, ψk, which can be implemented on a k-clique graph G.
The main idea is to apply the Water-Filling Strategy whenever the state is inside the same
clique with the goal and to freeze time whenever the state is outside. Define the counter
Lptq to be the number of times the state X has been in the clique that contains the goal,
VD, by time t:
Lptq “
tÿ
s“1
IpXs P VDq. (21)
Definition 6 (Clique Water-Filling Strategy). Fix target risk level q¯ P r0, 1s. Let G “
pV, Eq be a k-clique graph with n vertices and let VD denote the set of vertices in the clique
containing the goal. The Clique Water-Filling Strategy, ψkq¯ , is defined as follows: for t P N
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1. If Xt R VD (agent not in the same clique as the goal), set at “ vVDl to go back to VD,
where Xt “ vil .
2. If Xt P VD, and T kIH ą t (no intentional goal-hitting so far):
(1) with probability pLptq, the agent chooses the Goal-Attempt meta action, where
Lptq and tptutPN were defined in Eqs. (21) and(13), respectively;
(2) otherwise, the agent chooses the Random-Step meta action.
3. If T kIH ď t, the agent always chooses the Random-Step action.
Now, we quantify the delay under ψk in terms of the expected intentional goal-hitting
time under the Water-Filling Strategy on a complete graph with nk vertices. The proof is
given in Appendix C.6. Intuitively, the delay under ψk is the sum of two terms: the expected
time spent in the clique containing the goal and the expected time spent outside. To prove
Proposition 3, we begin by providing an upper bound on the expected total time the agent
spends outside VD. Then, we observe that the time spent inside VD is less than the expected
intentional goal-hitting time under ψwf , where the time is indexed by the counter L and
hence, conclude the proof.
Proposition 3. Fix target risk level q¯ P r0, 1s. Fix a degree sequence tp¯nunPN such that
p¯n ď n and p¯n " ?n. Fix graph size n P N and clique number k P N such that nk`k´1 ď p¯n.
Let G “ pV, Eq be a k-clique graph with |V| “ n. Under the Clique Water-Filling Strategy,
ψkq¯ , the expected delay satisfies
EpT kq ď EpTwfIHq
ˆ
1` k
2
p1´ εqpn` pk ´ 1qkq ` εk
˙
,
where TwfIH is the intentional goal-hitting time under the Water-Filling Strategy ψ
wf
q¯ , on a
complete graph with nk vertices.
Suppose the adversary knows the clique containing the goal, VD. Then, the adversary
can simply ignore whenever the agent is outside VD. Consequently, from the perspective
of the adversary, the game reduces to predicting D of an agent using ψwf on a complete
graph with nk vertices. This implies that the maximal prediction risk under ψ
k
q¯ can be upper
bounded by the maximal prediction risk under ψwfq¯ on a complete graph with
n
k vertices.
Hence, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. Fix a degree sequence tp¯nunPN such that p¯n ď n and p¯n " ?n. Fix graph
size n P N and clique number k P N such that nk ` k ´ 1 ď p¯n. Let G “ pV, Eq be a k-clique
graph with |V| “ n. Under the Clique Water-Filling Strategy, ψkq¯ , the maximal prediction
risk satisfies
q˚pψkq¯q ď q¯ ` δn,
where δn “ wKn ` 1´
`
1´ kn
˘Kn
, and lim
nÑ8 δn “ 0.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3 by combining Proposition 3 and Corollary 1.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let G P G¯pn, p¯nq be a k-clique graph with n vertices, for some
k P N such that nk ` k ´ 1 ď p¯n. Then, consider the agent strategy ψkq¯ , that is, the Clique
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Water-Filling Strategy with target risk level q¯ P r0, 1s. By Proposition 3, the expected delay
under strategy ψk satisfies
EpT kq ď EpTwfIH q
ˆ
1` k
2
p1´ εqpn` pk ´ 1qkq ` εk
˙
:“ EpTwfIH qp1` xq.
Then, to obtain EpT kq ď w, it suffices to have EpTwfIH qp1 ` xq ď w. By Lemma 2, for
EpTwfIH q ď y, it suffices to set q¯ “ 12y´1´cε where cε “ εp1´εq2 . Thus, letting y “ w1`x ,
Corollary 1 implies
Qpwq ď q˚pψkq ď q¯ ` δn “ 1
2wρεnpkq ´ 1´ cε ` δn,
where ρεnpkq “ 11`x “ p1´εqpn`k
2´kq`εk
n`2k2´k´εpn`k2´2kq . Finally, by the assumption p¯n "
?
n, for each
k P N, we have lim
nÑ8 ρ
ε
npkq “ 1. This completes the proof of Theorem 3. ˝
Note that as k increases, the average degree of the network with design parameter k
decreases while the prediction risk grows. Therefore, by tuning the value of k, one can
design a private network with the most efficient cost and privacy trade-off within this family.
Finally, letting nÑ8, we obtain the following upper bound on the minimax prediction risk
Qpwq ď 1
2w ´ 1´ cε ,
implying that the performance on complete graphs can be asymptotically achieved by a
careful design of the network topology.
9.3 Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
9.3.1 Delay: Proof of Proposition 1
In this section, we will characterize the agent’s delay under the Water-Filling Strategies and
prove Proposition 1. We will begin by observing that the expected delay can be broken into
two components: time spent in the neighborhood of D and the total time spent outside.
To analyze the first term, we will use the concept of intentional goal-hitting time. Next,
using the Neighborhood Overlap property we will show that an agent using a random walk
will “stumble” upon the neighborhood of her goal every 1p time steps on average. We will
subsequently combine this observation with a “time-stretching” argument to establish that
the delay on a graph satisfying the Neighborhood Overlap property is upper-bounded by
the delay on a complete graph, but slowed down by a factor of 1p .
Recall the counter Lptq that tracks the total time spent in the neighborhood of D. For
all t ě 1, let Cot “ t´Lptq so that Cot records the total time spent outside N pDq up to time
t. Then, we can write the expected delay as the sum of the two counters at time T :
EpT q “ EpLpT qq ` EpCoT q. (22)
Suppose G is a complete graph. Since every vertex of G is in the neighborhood of D,
we will have CoT “ 0. This suggests that we can interpret LpT q as the goal-hitting time on
a complete graph under the Water-Filling Strategy, Twf . Using this observation, Lemma 2
derives an upper bound on EpTwf q “ EpLpT qq in terms of the intentional goal-hitting time
on a complete graph under the Water-Filling Strategy, TwfIH . The proof is in Appendix C.2.
7
7In the remainder, we may suppress the argument q¯ from ψwf for notational convenience, when the
context is clear.
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Lemma 2. Fix graph size n P N, and target risk level q¯ P r0, 1s. Let G “ pV, Eq be a complete
graph with |V| “ n. Under the Water-Filling Strategy, ψwfq¯ , the expected goal-hitting and
intentional goal-hitting times satisfy
EpTwfq ď EpTwfIHq ď
1
2q¯
` 1
2
` q¯ε
2p1´ εq2 .
Hence, on any undirected connected graph G under the Water-Filling Strategy we will
have
EpLpT qq ď 1
2q¯
` 1
2
` q¯ε
2p1´ εq2 .
Crucially, the noise level ε has an additive effect on the delay, in contrast to the per step
overhead under forced pre-commitment.
To control the expected delay, we need to ensure that time spent outside N pDq is small.
For this purpose, we now use the Neighborhood Overlap property and derive an upper bound
on the expected delay. The following result establishes that the delay under ψwf is upper-
bounded by the expected intentional goal-hitting time under the Water-Filling Strategy
on a complete graph, scaled by 1p . Intuitively, the vertices of the graph G are on average
connected to p fraction of the vertices so that under ψwf , the agent has an opportunity to
attempt her goal p fraction of the time. Using a coupling argument we show that EpTwfIH q
slowed down by 1p gives an upper bound for EpT q. The proof is given in Appendix C.3.
Lemma 3. Fix graph size n P N, and target risk level q¯ P r0, 1s. Let G “ pV, Eq be a graph
with
ˇˇV ˇˇ “ n. Suppose G satisfies the Neighborhood Overlap property with parameter p.
Under the Water-Filling Strategy, ψwfq¯ , the expected delay satisfies
EpT q ď EpT
wf
IHq
p
,
where TwfIH is the intentional goal-hitting time under the Water-Filling Strategy, ψ
wf
q¯ , on a
complete graph with n vertices.
Finally, we combine Lemmas 2 and 3 to obtain
EpT q ď 1
p
ˆ
1
2q¯
` 1
2
` q¯ε
2p1´ εq2
˙
.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 1. ˝
9.3.2 Prediction Risk: Proof of Proposition 2
We now turn to the agent’s prediction risk under the Water-Filling Strategies and prove
Proposition 2. Recall that the maximal prediction risk, q˚pψq, is given by the following
expression
sup
χ
qpψ, χq “ sup
χ
PpDˆχ “ Dq ` PpT ą Kq.
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We first note that the probability with which the adversary succeeds due to the agent
failing to reach the goal by the end of the horizon diminishes as the length of the horizon
increases, i.e., lim
KÑ8PpT ą Kq “ 0. Specifically, for any agent strategy ψ, we have
PpT ą Kq ď EpT q
K
ď w
K
,
by the Markov’s Inequality and the definition of the delay budget w. Then, for fixed ψ and
w, we conclude lim
KÑ8PpT ą Kq “ 0 since limKÑ8
w
K “ 0.
Next, we analyze the probability that the adversary makes a correct prediction, supχ PpDˆχ “
Dq. Specifically, we will first show that supχ PpDˆχ “ Dq is upper bounded by the sum of
two terms: (1) the probability that adversary predicts the intentional goal-hitting time cor-
rectly, and (2) the probability that the intentional goal-hitting time differs from the actual
goal-hitting time. Then, we will prove Lemmas 4 and 5 to provide upper bounds for these
terms, respectively.
Let pTIH denote the optimal Bayes estimator for TIH . That is, for a given trajectory
realization x, let pTIH pxq “ arg maxtě1 PpTIH “ t ˇˇX “ xq. Using this definition, we will
first analyze the probability that the adversary succeeds by predicting correctly. Let X be
the set of all trajectories under horizon K. Then, we can write
sup
χ
PpDˆχ “ Dq “
ÿ
xPX
max
tě1 PpT “ t
ˇˇ
X “ xqPpX “ xq
paqď
ÿ
xPX
max
tě1 rPpTIH “ t
ˇˇ
X “ xq ` PpTIH ‰ T
ˇˇ
X “ xqsPpX “ xq
“
˜ÿ
xPX
max
tě1 PpX “ x, TIH “ tq
¸
` PpTIH ‰ T q
pbq“Pp pTIH “ TIH q ` PpTIH ‰ T q, (23)
where paq follows from the observation that for each t ě 1, the following holds
PpT “ t ˇˇX “ xq “PpT “ t, TIH “ T ˇˇX “ xq ` PpT “ t, TIH ‰ T ˇˇX “ xq
ďPpTIH “ t, TIH “ T
ˇˇ
X “ xq ` PpTIH ‰ T
ˇˇ
X “ xq
ďPpTIH “ t
ˇˇ
X “ xq ` PpTIH ‰ T
ˇˇ
X “ xq,
and pbq from the definition of pTIH as the optimal Bayes estimator for TIH .
Note that the two terms on the right-hand side of (23) correspond to the adversary’s
success in predicting the intentional goal-hitting time, Pp pTIH “ TIH q, and the probability
that the intentional goal-hitting time differs from the actual goal-hitting time, PpTIH ‰ T q.
We first state Lemma 4 which will provide an upper bound on the success probability of
the optimal Bayes estimator for TIH . To prove Lemma 4, we leverage a path counting argu-
ment and analyze the trajectories that can be generated under the Water-Filling Strategies.
The proof is given in Appendix C.4.
Lemma 4. Fix graph size n P N, and target risk level q¯ P r0, 1s. Let G “ pV, Eq be a graph
with |V| “ n. Under the Water-Filling Strategy, ψwfq¯ ,
Pp pTIH “ TIHq ď q¯∆G
n
,
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where ∆G is the maximum degree of G, i.e., ∆G “ max
vPV |N pvq|.
Next, we state Lemma 5 quantifying the probability that TIH and T are different under
ψwf . The proof relies on a trajectory based analysis of T and explicitly uses the design of
the strategy ψwf . The proof is provided in Appendix C.5.
Lemma 5. Fix graph size n P N, and target risk level q¯ P r0, 1s. Let G “ pV, Eq be a graph
with |V| “ n. Under the Water-Filling Strategy, ψwfq¯ ,
PpTIH ‰ T q ď 1´
ˆ
1´ 1
∆G
˙K
,
where ∆G is the minimum degree of G, i.e., ∆G “ min
vPV |N pvq|.
We now apply Lemmas 4 and 5 to the terms in (23), respectively. Thus, we obtain
sup
χ
PpDˆχ “ Dq ďPp pTIH “ TIH q ` PpTIH ‰ T qď q¯∆G
n
` 1´
ˆ
1´ 1
∆G
˙K
,
and, we conclude q˚pψwf q ď q¯∆Gn ` 1´
´
1´ 1∆G
¯K ` wK . Note that we can replace K with
Kn since we have Kn Ñ 8 as n Ñ 8. Finally, we define δ1n “ wKn ` 1 ´
´
1´ 1∆G
¯Kn
and
observe that lim
nÑ8 δ
1
n “ 0 holds. This completes the proof of Proposition 2. ˝
10 Proofs of Lower Bounds
10.1 Lower Bound in Theorem 1
So far, we have demonstrated that it is possible for the agent to harness the intrinsic un-
certainty to achieve an additive delay overhead. In this section, we will focus on the lower
bound and show that the agent always has to bear this strictly positive overhead due to
uncertainty, even if the delay budget w is large. That is, the effect of even a mild amount
of uncertainty can never be fully naturalized.
To prove the lower bound in Theorem 1, we follow three main steps. We begin by showing
that when the number of vertices is sufficiently large, EpTψq and EpTψIH q coincide. Second,
for any strategy ψ, we define its maximal time-only prediction risk, q˜ψ, as its maximal
prediction risk when the adversary strategy only uses the distribution of TψIH to make a
prediction, and not the actual trajectory. Consequently, we conclude that the maximal
prediction risk is asymptotically lower bounded by q˜ψ. Third, we establish that among all
agent strategies that can be defined on a complete graph G with n vertices, the strategy ψwfq¯
minimizes EpTψIH q subject to the constraint that q˜ψ is at most q¯. Thus, for any delay budget,
we can assert that the minimum target risk level that can be attained by a Water-Filling
Strategy with this budget is a lower bound on the maximal time-only prediction risk for any
strategy with that budget. Note that we can also conclude the Water-Filling Strategies are
optimal. Precisely, given any target risk level they minimize the delay and given any delay
budget they achieve minimal prediction risk.
Lemma 6 states that for sufficiently large complete graphs, EpTψq and EpTψIH q are equiv-
alent so that we can use EpTψIH q as a proxy for EpTψq. The proof is in Appendix C.7.
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Lemma 6. Fix graph size n P N. Let G “ pV, Eq be a complete graph with |V| “ n. Let ψ
be an agent strategy on G. Under ψ, the expected goal-hitting and intentional goal-hitting
times satisfy
EpTψIHq ď EpTψq ` σn,
where σn “
´
1´ `1´ 1n˘Kn¯ KnpKn`1q2 , and limnÑ8σn “ 0.
Note that Lemma 6 allows us to state EpTψq ď EpTψIH q ď EpTψq ` σn, since the first
inequality always holds. Thus, for sufficiently large graphs EpTψIH q is a good approximation
for EpTψq.
Now, we analyze the maximal prediction risk. For any strategy ψ, define its maximal
time-only prediction risk,
q˜ψ “ max
tPN PpT
ψ
IH “ tq.
The next lemma shows that the maximal prediction risk under any strategy ψ is lower-
bounded by its maximal time-only prediction risk, q˜ψ, as the number of vertices increases.
For sufficiently large graphs, this allows us to use the maximal time-only prediction risk, q˜ψ
as a lower bound on q˚pψq. The proof is given in Appendix C.8.
Lemma 7. Fix graph size n P N. Let G “ pV, Eq be a complete graph with |V| “ n. Let ψ
be an agent strategy on G. Under ψ, the maximal prediction risk satisfies
q˚pψq ě p1´ δ¯nqq˜ψ,
where δ¯n “ 1´
`
1´ 1n
˘Kn
, and lim
nÑ8 δ¯n “ 0.
We now use Lemmas 6 and 7 to derive the lower bound. Recall that Φw denotes the
class of strategies under which the expected intentional goal-hitting time is at most w.
Define qˆpwq to be the minimum q˜ψ value attained by some strategy in this class, where
q˜ψ “ max
tPN PpT
ψ
IH “ tq as before. That is, let
qˆpwq “ inf
ψPΦw
q˜ψ.
For any ψ such that EpTψq ď w, Lemma 6 implies EpTψIH q ď w ` σn and consequently,
Ψw Ď Φw`σn . From this observation, for any ψ, we can write
inf
ψPΨw
q˜ψ ě inf
ψPΦw`σn
q˜ψ “ qˆpw ` σnq. (24)
Then, we obtain
Qpwq paq“ inf
ψPΨw
q˚pψq pbqě inf
ψPΨw
p1´ δ¯nqq˜ψ
pcqě p1´ δ¯nq inf
ψPΨw
q˜ψ
pdqě p1´ δ¯nqqˆpw ` σnq, (25)
where paq, pbq and pdq follow from the definition of Qpwq, Lemma 7, and Eq. (24), respec-
tively. Finally, pcq is due to the observation that 1´ δ¯n ě 0 and is independent of ψ.
To conclude the lower bound from Eq. (25), we need the following result on the optimality
of ψwf . Lemma 8 establishes that the Water-Filling Strategy actually achieves minimal
expected intentional goal-hitting time subject to the maximal time-only prediction risk
being upper-bounded by the target risk level. The proof can be found in Appendix C.9.
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Lemma 8. Fix graph size n P N and q¯ P r0, 1s. Let G “ pV, Eq be a complete graph with
|V| “ n. The Water-Filling Strategy with target risk level q¯ solves the optimization problem,
min
ψPΨ EpT
ψ
IHq s.t. max
tPN PpT
ψ
IH “ tq ď q¯,
where Ψ denotes the set of all agent strategies defined on G.
Recall that q¯pwq is the minimum target risk level q¯ that can be attained by a Water-
Filling Strategy with expected intentional goal-hitting time at most w. Then, by Lemma 6,
we have that
q¯pwq “ inftq¯ : Dψwfq¯ P Φwu ď inftq¯ : Dψwfq¯ P Ψw´σnu,
since Ψw´σn Ď Φw. In addition, by Lemma 8, if under any strategy ψ we have EpTψIH q ă
EpTwfIH q, then it must be the case that q˜ψ ą q˜ψwf . Therefore, using Lemma 8 and Eq. (25),
we obtain
Qpwq ě p1´ δ¯nqq¯pw ` σnq. (26)
To complete the lower bound, we recall the derivation of q¯pwq and again use the Taylor
expansion of
?
1´ x for x ă 1. Consequently, letting αεpwq “ εp2w´1qp1´εq2 , we obtain
1
2w ´ 1´ αεpwq ď q¯pwq. (27)
Then, combining Eqs. (26) and (27) gives
Qpwq ě 1´ δ¯n
2w ´ 1´ αεpw ` σnq ` σn
paqě 1´ δ¯n
2w ´ 1´ αεpwq ` σ1n
pbqě 1
2w ´ 1´ αεpwq ´ δ˜n,
where paq and pbq are obtained by the Taylor expansion of αεpwq and 1x , respectively, and
we let
σ1n “ σn
ˆ
1` 2p2w ´ 1q2 ¨
ε
p1´ εq2
˙
, and δ˜n “ δ¯n
2w ´ 1´ αεpwq ` σ1n `
σ1n
p2w ´ 1´ αεpwqq2 .
Hence, we observe lim
nÑ8 δ˜n “ 0 and conclude the lower bound:
Qpwq ě 1
2w ´ 1´ αεpwq ´ δ˜n. (28)
Finally, we let δn “ maxtδ˜n, δ1nu. Then, combining Eqs. (20) and (28), we get
1
2w ´ 1´ αεpwq ´ δn ď Qpwq ď
1
2w ´ 1´ αεpwq ´ βεpwq ` δn. (29)
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. ˝
Observe that Eq. (29) yields an asymptotically tight characterization of the minimax
prediction risk in the context of complete graphs. Specifically, letting nÑ8, we have
1
2w ´ 1´ αεpwq ď Qpwq ď
1
2w ´ 1´ αεpwq ´ βεpwq .
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10.2 Lower Bounds in Theorems 2 and 3
To prove the lower bounds in Theorems 2 and 3, we apply the lower bound in Theorem 1 of
Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018). We first note that the addition of noise makes the strategy space
of the agent more restrictive than the deterministic setting pε “ 0q, since in the latter case
the agent can also simulate the noise in her state transition if necessary. Moreover, we model
an offline adversary rather than an online adversary who needs to make a correct prediction
before the agent reaches her goal vertex. Since the offline adversary is more powerful than
its online counterpart, the prediction risk against an offline adversary will be greater than
that against an online adversary. As a result, the prediction risk lower bound in Tsitsiklis
and Xu (2018) for the deterministic setting with an online adversary will still hold in our
case. The lower bounds in Theorems 2 and 3 thus follow from the lower bound in Theorem
1 of Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018) and we conclude the proof.
For completeness, we state Theorem 1 of Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018) below and provide its
proof in Appendix C.10. The proof examines a simple adversary strategy that guarantees a
prediction risk of at least 12w`1 . Intuitively, for the delay to be at most w, the distribution of
the goal-hitting time T has to be concentrated. This implies that, under any agent strategy
ψ with delay budget w, there exists a time tpψq P N such that the goal-hitting time T is
equal to tpψq with probability at least 12w`1 . Therefore, the adversary can predict the goal
vertex to be the agent state at time tpψq and achieve a prediction risk of at least 12w`1 .
Theorem 4 (Theorem 1 of Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018)). Fix n P N, ε “ 0 and let G “ pV, Eq
be a connected undirected graph with n vertices. Fix x0 P V and w P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , nu. Then, the
minimax prediction risk under a time budget of w satisfies
1
2w ` 1 ď Qpwq. (30)
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A Example Instance
Suppose that G is as in Figure 5. The agent starts at vertex 1 and her secret goal is D “ 5.
The agent’s trajectory is 1 Ñ 2 Ñ 3 Ñ 5 whereas her strategy is given by the sequence of
actions a1 “ 3, a2 “ 3, a3 “ 5. The sequence of Bernoulli trials is given by B1 “ B3 “ 1
and B2 “ 0. Note that the state of the agent at time t “ 2 being 2 even though her action
was vertex 3 exemplifies a case in which the agent ends up at a different vertex due to noise.
Assume that the adversary predicts that the goal vertex is 3, i.e., Dˆ “ 3. Since Dˆ ‰ D, the
agent succeeds with a goal-hitting time of T “ 4. Nonetheless, if the adversary had made a
prediction Dˆ “ 5, then he would have succeeded.
1X1
2X2
3
X3
Dˆ
4
5
X4
D
Figure 5: An example of the Anonymous Stochastic Routing model.
B Sample k-Clique Graph
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Figure 6: A 3-clique graph with 5 vertices in each clique. For simplicity, self edges are not
drawn. Sets of vertices t1, 2, 3, 4, 5u, t6, 7, 8, 9, 10u and t11, 12, 13, 14, 15u correspond to the
three cliques.
C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. To prove that a graph generated using the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph model belongs
to the family Gnppq with high probability, we will examine each property in Definition 3
34
separately. We will begin by verifying the upper bound on the degree using the Chernoff
bound. Then, we will repeat similar arguments to prove the lower bound on the degree and
the Neighborhood Overlap property.
Degree upper bound. For each vertex v P V, define the event Av “ t|N pvq| ě pnp1`γnqu
to represent whether the degree of v is greater than pnp1`γnq. Since |N pvq| „ Binomialpn, pq
under the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph model, using the Chernoff bound with γn ě 0 we
obtain
PpAvq “ Pp|N pvq| ě pnp1` γnqq ď exp
ˆ´γ2npn
2` γn
˙
. (31)
Then, the probability that the maximum degree is at most pnp1` γnq can be written as
P
ˆ
max
vPV |N pvq| ď pnp1` γnq
˙
“1´ P
˜ď
vPV
Av
¸
ě1´
ÿ
vPV
PpAvq
paqě1´ n exp
ˆ´γ2npn
2` γn
˙
, (32)
where paq uses (31). Recall that γn satisfies γn "
a
log n{n and lim
nÑ8 γn “ 0. This implies
that exppnγ2nq " n and consequently we obtain lim
nÑ8n exp
´´γ2npn
2`γn
¯
“ 0. Hence, we conclude
that the degrees of all vertices are upper-bounded by pnp1 ` γnq with high probability as
nÑ8, i.e., lim
nÑ8P
ˆ
max
vPV |N pvq| ď pnp1` γnq
˙
“ 1.
Degree lower bound. As in the proof for the upper bound, for any vertex v P V define
the event Bv “ t|N pvq| ď pnp1 ´ γnqu to represent whether the degree of v is less than
pnp1´ γnq. Using the Chernoff bound with γn P r0, 1s we get
PpBvq “ Pp|N pvq| ď pnp1´ γnqq ď exp
ˆ´γ2npn
2
˙
. (33)
Similarly, we write the probability that the minimum degree is at least pnp1´ γnq as
P
ˆ
min
vPV |N pvq| ě pnp1´ γnq
˙
“1´ P
˜ď
vPV
Bv
¸
ě1´
ÿ
vPV
PpBvq
paqě1´ n exp
ˆ´γ2npn
2
˙
, (34)
where paq follows from (33).
Once again we recall γn "
a
log n{n and lim
nÑ8 γn “ 0. Then, we can write exppnγ
2
nq " n
and obtain lim
nÑ8n exp
´´γ2npn
2
¯
“ 0. Thus, we conclude that the degrees of all vertices are
lower-bounded by pnp1´ γnq with high probability as nÑ8, i.e.,
lim
nÑ8P
ˆ
min
vPV |N pvq| ě pnp1´ γnq
˙
“ 1. (35)
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Neighborhood Overlap. For each pair of vertices u, v P V, define the event Cuv “! |N puqXN pvq|
|N pvq| ď pp1´ γnq
)
. For simplicity of notation, denote the random variables
ˇˇN puqX
N pvq ˇˇ and ˇˇN pvq ˇˇ by Suv and Sv, respectively. Note that Sv „ Binomialpn, pq, and
Suv „ Binomialpn, p2q. The probability that the Neighborhood Overlap property holds can
be written as
P
˜ ˇˇN puq XN pvq ˇˇˇˇN pvq ˇˇ ě pp1´ γnq,@u, v P V
¸
“ 1´ P
˜ ď
u,vPV
Cuv
¸
ě 1´
ÿ
u,vPV
PpCuvq.
(36)
Next, we will derive an upper bound on PpCuvq. To this end, let η P r0, 1s and for each
vertex v P V, define the event Dv “ tSv ă npp1 ` ηqu. Applying the Chernoff bound with
η ě 0 for Sv, we obtain PpDcvq “ 1´ PpDvq ď exp
´
´η2pn
2`η
¯
.
Similarly, for each pair of vertices u, v P V, define the event Duv “ tSuv ą np2p1´ ηqu.
Then, the Chernoff bound applied to Suv with η P r0, 1s implies PpDcuvq “ 1 ´ PpDuvq ď
exp
´
´η2np2
2
¯
.
Now, observe that Dv XDuv Ď
!
Suv
Sv
ą p
´
1´η
1`η
¯)
holds so that we write PpDv XDuvq ď
P
´
Suv
Sv
ą p
´
1´η
1`η
¯¯
. Equivalently, we have
P
ˆ
Suv
Sv
ď p
ˆ
1´ η
1` η
˙˙
ď1´ PpDv XDuvq “ PpDcv YDcuvq ď PpDcvq ` PpDcuvq.
Since η P r0, 1s, we further have
P
ˆ
Suv
Sv
ď p p1´ 2ηq
˙
ď P
ˆ
Suv
Sv
ď p
ˆ
1´ η
1` η
˙˙
.
Hence, choosing η “ γn2 , we obtain
PpCuvq ď PpDcvq ` PpDcuvq ď exp
ˆ ´γ2npn
8` 2γn
˙
` exp
ˆ´γ2nnp2
8
˙
. (37)
Lastly, combining Eqs. (36) and (37) yields
P
˜ ˇˇN puq XN pvq ˇˇˇˇN pvq ˇˇ ě pp1´ γnq,@u, v P V
¸
ě 1´
ÿ
u,vPV
PpCuvq
ě 1´ n2
ˆ
exp
ˆ ´γ2npn
8` 2γn
˙
` exp
ˆ´γ2nnp2
8
˙˙
. (38)
We now observe that the assumptions γn "
a
log n{n and lim
nÑ8 γn “ 0 imply exppnγ
2
nq "
n2. Consequently, we can conclude lim
nÑ8n
2 exp
´´γ2npn
8`2γn
¯
“ 0 and lim
nÑ8n
2 exp
´´γ2nnp2
8
¯
“ 0.
Therefore, we obtain lim
nÑ8P
´ |N puqXN pvq|
|N pvq| ě pp1´ γnq,@u, v P V
¯
“ 1 and conclude that
Neighborhood Overlap property holds with high probability as nÑ8. Finally, we combine
36
(32), (34), and (38) to obtain
PpG P Gnq ě 1´ P
˜ď
vPV
Av `Bv
¸
´ P
˜ ď
u,vPV
Cuv
¸
ě 1´ n
ˆ
exp
ˆ´γ2npn
2` γn
˙
` exp
ˆ´γ2npn
2
˙˙
´ n2
ˆ
exp
ˆ ´γ2npn
8` 2γn
˙
` exp
ˆ´γ2nnp2
8
˙˙
“ 1´ θn.
We observe that lim
nÑ8 θn “ 0 follows. This completes the proof that under the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
model, the degrees of vertices are upper- and lower-bounded by pnp1` γnq and pnp1´ γnq,
and the Neighborhood Overlap property holds with high probability as nÑ8. ˝
C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Suppose G is a complete graph. We will compute the expected intentional goal-
hitting time on G under the assumption that the horizon is infinite. Then, when the horizon
is finite, i.e., K ă 8, we can simply truncate the goal-hitting time at time K which will
result in a smaller expected delay.
For simplicity of notation, let us define qt “ PpTIH “ tq and note that q0 “ 0. In order to
calculate the expected value of the intentional goal-hitting time, we condition on the event
tTIH ě tu and obtain a recursive equation on qt:
qt “PpTIH “ t
ˇˇ
TIH ě tqPpTIH ě tq ` PpTIH “ t
ˇˇ
TIH ă tqPpTIH ă tq
“PpTIH “ t
ˇˇ
TIH ě tq
˜
1´
t´1ÿ
i“1
qi
¸
` 0
˜
t´1ÿ
i“1
qi
¸
paq“pt´1p1´ εq
˜
1´
t´1ÿ
i“1
qi
¸
,
where paq follows from the following observation:
PpTIH “ t
ˇˇ
TIH ě tq “ PpF¯t “ 1
ˇˇ
TIH ě tq “ Ppa¯t´1 “ a¯G, Xt “ D,Bt´1 “ 1
ˇˇ
TIH ě tq “ pt´1p1´ εq.
Solving recursively, we obtain:
qt “
#
q¯, if 1 ď t ă t˚,
εt´t˚`1 p1´ εq p1´ pt˚ ´ 1qq¯q , otherwise.
Finally, we compute the expected intentional goal-hitting time under ψwfq¯ :
EpTIH q “EpTIH
ˇˇ
TIH ă t˚qPpTIH ă t˚q ` EpTIH
ˇˇ
TIH ě t˚qPpTIH ě t˚q
“ t
˚ ´ 1` 1
2
ppt˚ ´ 1qq¯q `
ˆ
t˚ ´ 1` 1
1´ ε
˙
p1´ pt˚ ´ 1qq¯q
“ q¯
2
ˆ
1
q¯
´ ε
1´ ε
˙ˆ
1
q¯
´ 1
1´ ε
˙
` 1
q¯
ˆ
1´ q¯
ˆ
1
q¯
´ 1
1´ ε
˙˙
“ 1
2q¯
` 1
2
` q¯ε
2p1´ εq2 .
When K ă 8, we will have EpTwf q ď EpTwfIH q ď 12q¯ ` 12 ` q¯ε2p1´εq2 . This completes the proof
of Lemma 2. ˝
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C.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Throughout the proof we will use the superscripts p and wf to denote quantities
on a graph G such that Neighborhood Overlap property holds with parameter p and on a
complete graph, respectively.
To prove Lemma 3, we will derive the expected time between two consecutive trials and
express the index of the successful trial in terms of TwfIH on a complete graph. For any
t ě 1, define Nt “ řti“1 IpXi P N pDqq to be the number of times the agent has been in the
neighborhood of her goal up to time t. Let Un “ suptt ě 1 : Nt ă nu denote the time of the
nth occurrence of this event. Under the Water-Filling Strategy, the system dynamics can
equivalently be generated as follows:
(1) Draw the goal, i.e., D „ UnifpVq.
(2) Draw the number of trials needed before the agent succeeds for the first time, R,
where the attempt probabilities are given by those under the Water-Filling Strategy
on a complete graph with n vertices, ψwfq¯ . Note that R “ TwfIH ´ 1.
(3) Generate a random walk of length K on G, tX1, ..., XKu. Then, set XK`1 “ D.
(4) If UR` 1 ď K, set XUR`1 “ D so that the agent indeed succeeds at her Rth attempt,
i.e., T pIH “ UR ` 1. Replace tXUR`2,...,XK u with a random walk starting at D.
Then, the observation T pIH “ UR ` 1 implies
EpT pIH ´ 1q “
8ÿ
r“1
EpUr
ˇˇ
R “ rqPpR “ rq paq“
8ÿ
r“1
EpUrqPpR “ rq, (39)
where paq follows from the independence of Ur and R.
Letting Yi “ Ui ´ Ui´1 and U0 “ 0, we can now write Ur “ řri“1 Yi. To analyze EpUrq,
we state Lemma 9 whose proof is given in Appendix C.3.1.
Lemma 9. Let Nt “ řti“1 IpXi P N pDqq where tXtutPN is the trajectory generated under
ψwf on G. Define Ui “ suptt ě 1 : Nt ă iu and Yi “ Ui ´Ui´1 for i ě 1. Then, EpYiq ď 1p .
Using Eq. (39) and applying Lemma 9 in step paq, we obtain:
EpT pIH ´ 1q “
8ÿ
r“1
E
˜
rÿ
i“1
Yi
¸
PpR “ rq paqď
8ÿ
r“1
rPpR “ rq
p
“ EpRq
p
pbq“ EpT
wf
IH q ´ 1
p
,
where pbq is due to EpRq “ EpTwfIH q ´ 1. Finally, since p ď 1, we get
EpT pq ď EpT pIH q ď
EpTwfIH q
p
´ 1
p
` 1 ď EpT
wf
IH q
p
.
Thus, we conclude the proof of Lemma 3. ˝
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C.3.1 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. Let Y˜ be a geometric random variable with success probability p, drawn indepen-
dently from the rest of the system. We will now show that for all t ě 1, PpY1 ą tq ď PpY˜ ą tq
holds so that Y1 is stochastically dominated by Y˜ . This will give the upper bound on EpY1q.
First, note that Y1 corresponds to the first hitting time of the random walk to the subset
N pDq and Yi the ith return time to N pDq. We begin with t “ 1. Write Zt “ IpXt P N pDqq
for t ě 1. Then,
PpY1 ą 1q “ PpZ1 “ 0q “ 1´
ˇˇN pX0q XN pDq ˇˇˇˇN pX0q ˇˇ ď 1´ p “ PpY˜ ą 1q,
by the Neighborhood Overlap property of the graph G. Next, suppose PpY1 ą tq ď PpY˜ ą tq
holds for some t P N. Then, we have
PpY1 ą t` 1q “PpY1 ą tqPpY1 ą t` 1
ˇˇ
Y1 ą tq
“PpY1 ą tqPpZt`1 “ 0
ˇˇ tZiuti“1 “ 0q
“PpY1 ą tq
¨˝ ÿ
vPN pXt´1q
PpZt`1 “ 0
ˇˇ tZiuti“1 “ 0, Xt “ vqPpXt “ v ˇˇ tZiuti“1 “ 0q‚˛
paq“PpY1 ą tq
¨˝ ÿ
vPN pXt´1q
PpZt`1 “ 0
ˇˇ
Xt “ vqPpXt “ v
ˇˇ tZiuti“1 “ 0q‚˛
ďPpY1 ą tq
¨˝ ÿ
vPN pXt´1q
ˆ
max
vPN pXt´1q
PpZt`1 “ 0
ˇˇ
Xt “ vq
˙
PpXt “ v
ˇˇ tZiuti“1 “ 0q‚˛
ďPpY1 ą tq
ˆ
max
vPN pXt´1q
PpZt`1 “ 0
ˇˇ
Xt “ vq
˙
pbq“PpY1 ą tq
˜
1´
ˇˇN pv¯q XN pDq ˇˇˇˇN pv¯q ˇˇ
¸
pcqďp1´ pqt`1
“PpY˜ ą t` 1q,
where paq is due to the Markov property, and pbq uses the definition v¯ “ arg maxtv P
N pXt´1q : PpZt`1 “ 0
ˇˇ
Xt “ vqu. Step pcq is again by the Neighborhood Overlap property
and induction.
Since PpY1 ą tq ď PpY˜ ą tq holds for all t ě 1 as claimed, we obtain that Y1 is
stochastically dominated by Y˜ . Hence, we conclude EpY1q ď EpY˜ q “ 1{p.
Finally, note that for Yi with i ą 1, the following still holds
PpYi ą 1q “ PpZUi`1 “ 0q “ 1´
ˇˇN pXUiq XN pDq ˇˇˇˇN pXUiq ˇˇ ď 1´ p “ PpY˜ ą 1q,
and a similar induction argument will conclude that PpYi ą tq ď PpY˜ ą tq for all t ě 1.
Note that the only difference in the argument is in the first step since XUi P N pDq rather
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than being chosen uniformly at random from V. Since the Neighborhood Overlap property
of the graph G holds for all pairs of vertices, we can conclude EpYiq ď EpY˜ q as before. This
completes the proof. ˝
C.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Let X denote the set of all trajectories under horizon K. Recall that for a given
trajectory realization x P X , the optimal Bayes estimator for TIH can be expressed aspTIH pxq “ arg maxtě1 PpTIH “ t ˇˇX “ xq. Then, we can write
Pp pTIH “ TIH q “ ÿ
xPX
PpX “ x, pTIH pxq “ TIH q
“
ÿ
xPX
Pp pTIH pxq “ TIH ˇˇX “ xqPpX “ xq
“
ÿ
xPX
max
tě1 PpTIH “ t
ˇˇ
X “ xqPpX “ xq
“
ÿ
xPX
max
tě1 PpX “ x, TIH “ tq. (40)
Now, we will compute the joint probability, PpX “ x, TIH “ tq. For this purpose, we will
first fix a vertex v P V. Then, we will condition on this fixed v being the goal and compute
PpX “ x, TIH “ t
ˇˇ
D “ vq. Finally, we will let v “ xt and complete the derivation of
PpX “ x, TIH “ tq.
To find PpX “ x, TIH “ t
ˇˇ
D “ vq, we now define a sequence of indicators tJiuKi“1 where
for each i, we write Ji “ 1 only if a successful goal-attempt occurs at time i under the
Water-Filling Strategy. Similarly, for each i ě 1, we let Ai denote the event tXi “ xiu and
define the events A˜i as follows:
A˜i “
#
tJi “ 1u if i “ t,
tJi “ 0u otherwise.
We can then write
PpX “ x, TIH “ t
ˇˇ
D “ vq “ P
˜
Kč
i“1
pAi X A˜iq
ˇˇ
D “ v
¸
“ P
˜
Kč
i“2
pAi X A˜iq
ˇˇ
A1 X A˜1, D “ v
¸
P
´
A1 X A˜1
ˇˇ
D “ v
¯
paq“
«
Kź
i“2
P
˜
Ai X A˜i
ˇˇ i´1č
j“1
Aj X A˜j , D “ v
¸ff
P
´
A1 X A˜1
ˇˇ
D “ v
¯
, (41)
where paq is obtained by recursively conditioning on the events Ai X A˜i for each i.
For every t ě 1, let Cvt denote the number of times a vertex which is a neighbor of
the vertex v appears in the trajectory x up to time t, i.e., Cvt “
řt
i“1 Ipxi P N pvqq. We
now define some useful indicator variables to facilitate our analysis. Recall the random
variables tBtu defined in Section 2 that capture intrinsic uncertainty: if Bt “ 1, then the
agent’s action in period t will be successfully executed whereas she will be sent to a random
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neighboring vertex, otherwise. With this notation, we define the following sequence tF¯tutPN
as the indicators for the event that the agent chooses Goal-Attempt at t and is successful:
F¯t`1 “ I
`
a¯t “ a¯G, Bt “ 1
˘
. (42)
Using this sequence, the intentional goal-hitting time, that is, the first time the agent chooses
the meta action Goal-Attempt (a¯t “ a¯G) and actually succeeds, can be written as
TIH “ inftt ě 1 : F¯t “ 1u (43)
Using these definitions, we next examine P
´
Ai X A˜i
ˇˇ Şi´1
j“1Aj X A˜j , D “ v
¯
for each i and
observe that one of four cases must hold.
Case 1: i ą t. Given a successful attempt has already occurred at t, the agent will do a
random walk under ψwf at every period i ą t. The Random-Step meta action yields Ji “ 0
so that we obtain
P
˜
Ai X A˜i
ˇˇ i´1č
j“1
Aj X A˜j , D “ v
¸
“ 1ˇˇN pxi´1q ˇˇ .
Case 2: i ă t and xi´1 R N pvq. Under ψwf , for each i ă t, the agent will choose the
Random-Step meta action if she is outside the neighborhood of the goal, v. Thus, we will
have
P
˜
Ai X A˜i
ˇˇ i´1č
j“1
Aj X A˜j , D “ v
¸
“ 1ˇˇN pxi´1q ˇˇ .
Case 3: i ă t and xi´1 P N pvq. If the agent is currently inside the neighborhood of
the goal v, and if there has not been a successful goal-attempt yet, the agent will choose
the corresponding action under the Water-Filling Strategy for period Cvi . Consequently, the
probability that the agent does not have a successful attempt at period i and travels to xi
can be written as
P
˜
Ai X A˜i
ˇˇ i´1č
j“1
Aj X A˜j , D “ v
¸
“ PpF¯C
v
i´1`1 “ 0qˇˇN pxi´1q ˇˇ .
Case 4: i “ t. Given that a successful attempt has not occurred up to time t, the agent
can reach her goal intentionally at t if (a) she is in the neighborhood of v at t´ 1, (b) xt is
equal to v, and (c) F¯Cvt´1`1 is 1. Therefore,
P
˜
At X A˜t
ˇˇ t´1č
j“1
Aj X A˜j , D “ v
¸
“ Itxt´1 P N pvquItxt “ vuPpF¯Cvt´1`1 “ 1q.
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Substituting these cases into (41), we obtain the following:
P
`
X “ x, TIH “ t
ˇˇ
D “ v˘
“
¨˝
t´1ź
i“1
´
Itxi´1 R N pvqu ` Itxi´1 P N pvquPpF¯Cvi´1`1 “ 0q
¯
ˇˇN pxi´1q ˇˇ ‚˛
¨ Itxt´1 P N pvquItxt “ vuPpF¯Cvt´1`1 “ 1q ¨
Kź
i“t`1
1ˇˇN pxi´1q ˇˇ
“
˜ź
i‰t
1
|N pxi´1q|
¸«
t´1ź
i“1
pItxi´1 R N pvqu
`Itxi´1 P N pvquPpF¯Cvi´1`1 “ 0q
¯ı
¨ Itxt´1 P N pvquItxt “ vuPpF¯Cvt´1`1 “ 1q. (44)
We now state and prove Lemma 10 to obtain an upper bound on the term
ś
i‰t
1
|N pxi´1q| .
We will shortly use Lemma 10.
Lemma 10. Let G “ pV, Eq be a connected undirected graph. Fix x0 P V and K P N.
Denote by X˜rKs the (random) trajectory of a K-step random walk on G that starts from x0.
Fix a K-step trajectory x, and t P t1, 2, . . . ,Ku. We haveź
iPt1,2,...,Kuzttu
1
|N pxi´1q| ď ∆GP
´
X˜rKs “ x
¯
. (45)
Proof of Lemma 10. We have thatź
i‰t
1
|N pxi´1q| ď max1ďsďK
ź
i‰s
1
|N pxi´1q|
“
ˆ
max
0ďsďK´1 |N pxsq|
˙ Kź
i“1
1
|N pxi´1q|
ď
ˆ
max
vPV |N pvq|
˙ Kź
i“1
1
|N pxi´1q|
“∆G
Kź
i“1
1
|N pxi´1q|
“∆GPpX˜rKs “ xq,
where the last step follows from the definition of a random walk. ˝
We now evoke Lemma 10 to obtain an upper bound on the term
ś
i‰t
1
|N pxi´1q| . Substi-
tuting (45) from Lemma 10 into (44), we have that
P
`
X “ x, TIH “ t
ˇˇ
D “ v˘ ď ∆GPpX˜rKs “ xq
¨
«
t´1ź
i“1
´
Itxi´1 R N pvqu ` Itxi´1 P N pvquPpF¯Cvi´1`1 “ 0q
¯ff
¨ Itxt´1 P N pvquItxt “ vuPpF¯Cvt´1`1 “ 1q. (46)
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Now, let x be a trajectory such that xt “ v, since otherwise we will have P
`
X “ x, TIH “ t
ˇˇ
D “ v˘ “
0. For this trajectory, observing that Itxt´1 P N pvquItxt “ vu “ 1 holds, we get:
“ ∆GPpX˜rKs “ xq
«
t´1ź
i“1
´
Itxi´1 R N pvqu ` Itxi´1 P N pvquPpF¯Cvi´1`1 “ 0q
¯ff
PpF¯Cvt´1`1 “ 1q
paq“ ∆GPpX˜rKs “ xq
¨˝
Cvt´2`1ź
i“1
PpF¯i “ 0q‚˛PpF¯Cvt´1`1 “ 1q
pbq“ ∆GPpX˜rKs “ xqPpTIH “ Cvt´1 ` 1q, (47)
where paq follows after substituting the values of Itxi´1 P N pvqu and Itxi´1 R N pvqu. Step
pbq is obtained by observing that the event
´Şt´1
i“1tF¯i “ 0u
¯
X tF¯t “ 1u is equivalent to
tTIH “ tu.
Next, we use (47) to characterize PpX “ x, TIH “ tq and replace v “ xt. We get:
PpX “ x, TIH “ tq “PpX “ x, TIH “ t
ˇˇ
D “ xtqPpD “ xtq
ď∆GPpX˜rKs “ xqPpTIH “ Cxtt´1 ` 1qPpD “ xtq
paqď∆GPpX˜rKs “ xqq¯PpD “ xtq
pbqď∆GPpX˜rKs “ xq
´ q¯
n
¯
, (48)
where step paq uses that PpTIH “ tq ď q¯ holds for all t ě 1 by design. Finally, step pbq is
obtained by recalling that the goal is drawn uniformly at random from V.
Since the right hand side of (48) is independent of t, we further have
max
tě1 PpX “ x, TIH “ tq ď ∆GPpX˜
rKs “ xq
´ q¯
n
¯
. (49)
Now, we substitute (49) into (40) and obtain
Pp pTIH “ TIH q ď ÿ
xPX
max
tě1 PpX “ x, TIH “ tq
ď
ÿ
xPX
∆GPpX˜rKs “ xq
´ q¯
n
¯
paq“ q¯∆G
n
.
Since X is the set of all trajectories of length K that can be traversed on G, X˜rKs always
takes values in X . Thus, step paq follows from the observation that ř
xPX
PpX˜rKs “ xq “ 1.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 4. ˝
C.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. To compute the probability that T and TIH are different under the Water-Filling
Strategy, we first condition on the value of TIH :
PpTIH ‰ T q “
K`1ÿ
h“1
PpTIH ‰ T
ˇˇ
TIH “ hqPpTIH “ hq. (50)
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Recall that if Bt “ 1, then the agent’s action in period t has been successful whereas she
has been sent to a random vertex, otherwise. For each 1 ď t ď K ` 1, define the random
variable At as follows:
At “ ItXt “ D and Bt´1 “ 0u,
so that At denotes whether there has been a goal hit that is not intentional, at time t.
Note that under ψwf , at any period t, we can have At “ 1 under one the following two
scenarios:
(1) the agent chooses the Random-Step meta action and is sent to D, or
(2) she chooses the Goal-Attempt meta action, fails with ε probability (i.e., Bt´1 “ 0),
and nature sends her to D.
Since both the Random-Step meta action and the intrinsic uncertainty sample a vertex
uniformly at random, independently from all other sources of randomness in the game,
tAtuK`1t“1 are independent. Hence, under ψwf , for any t we have:
PpAt “ 1q “ pCt´1ε` p1´ pCt´1qˇˇN pXt´1q ˇˇ ItXt´1 P N pDqu ď 1∆G , (51)
where Ct “ řti“1 ItXi P N pDqu and ∆G “ minvPV ˇˇN pvq ˇˇ .
With this notation, given TIH “ h, we will have TIH “ T if for all t ă h, At is 0. We
can then write PpTIH “ T
ˇˇ
TIH “ hq as follows:
PpTIH “ T
ˇˇ
TIH “ hq “P
˜
h´1č
t“1
tAt “ 0u
¸
paq“
h´1ź
t“1
P pAt “ 0q
pbqě
ˆ
1´ 1
∆G
˙h´1
, (52)
where paq is due to the independence of tAtuK`1t“1 and pbq follows from (51).
Finally, we substitute (52) into (50) and obtain:
PpTIH ‰ T q “
K`1ÿ
h“1
PpTIH ‰ T
ˇˇ
TIH “ hqPpTIH “ hq
ď
K`1ÿ
h“1
«
1´
ˆ
1´ 1
∆G
˙h´1ff
PpTIH “ hq
“E
˜
1´
ˆ
1´ 1
∆G
˙TIH´1¸
paqď1´
ˆ
1´ 1
∆G
˙EpTIHq´1
pbqď1´
ˆ
1´ 1
∆G
˙K
,
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where paq and pbq are due to the Jensen’s Inequality and EpTIH q ď K`1, respectively. This
completes the proof of Lemma 5. ˝
C.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Similar to the counter Lptq, define another counter Cot such that for all t ě 1, we have
Lptq ` Cot “ t. Note that Cot records the total time spent outside VD up to time t.
Proof. Let us first find an upper bound on the expected total excursion time, that is,
expected total time the agent spends outside VD. For this purpose, we will use a coupling
argument to analyze an alternative system in which transitions to VzVD from both VD and
VzVD are more likely. Further, we will ignore the cases in which D is hit while returning
back to VD from VzVD. Then, the expected intentional goal-hitting time in this alternative
system will provide an upper bound for the original T kIH . Denote the number of vertices in
each clique by m “ nk .
Under ψk, in each period i ě 1, the probability that the state will make a transition
from VD to VzVD can be written as
PpXi`1 R VD
ˇˇ
Xi P VDq “p1´ pLpiqp1´ εqqpkq
m` k ´ 1 :“ si.
Let pΩ,F ,Pq be a probability space and let U “ tUiuiPN be a sequence of i.i.d. random
variables with uniform distribution over r0, 1s defined in this space. Construct the sequence
of independent Bernoulli random variables tCiuiPN as follows: let
Ci “
#
1, if Ui ă si,
0, otherwise,
where the event tCi “ 1u denotes that there is a transition leaving VD at time i. Then, we
can represent the number of transitions leaving VD up to time t by Yt “ řti“1 Ci.
Similarly, construct another sequence of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables tC˜iuiPN such
that
C˜i “
#
1, if Ui ă km`k´1 ,
0, otherwise,
and define Y˜t “ řti“1 C˜i. Observe that whenever Yt increases by 1, so does Y˜t even though
Yt might stay constant or increase whenever Y˜t increases by 1. This implies that PpYt ď
Y˜t,@tq “ 1 and the expected number of transitions leaving VD up to time t, i.e., EpYtq,
satisfies EpYtq ď EpY˜tq.
Next, define Zj as the time the agent spends outside VD when she leaves VD for the jth
time. We know that under ψk in each period i ě 1, the probability that the state will stay
in VzVD is
PpXi`1 R VD
ˇˇ
Xi R VDq “εpm` k ´ 2q
m` k ´ 1 .
This implies tZjujPN is a sequence of i.i.d. geometric random variables with success proba-
bility 1´ ε` εm`k´1 .
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Finally, we combine these results where we write H “ TwfIH to simplify notation whenever
TwfIH is a subscript. The expected total excursion time under ψ
k satisfies:
EpCoHq “ E
˜
YHÿ
j“1
Zj
¸
ď E
¨˝
Y˜Hÿ
j“1
Zj‚˛paq“ EpY˜HqEpZ1q “ E
¨˝
TwfIHÿ
i“1
C˜i‚˛EpZ1q pbq“ EpTwfIH qEpC˜1q
1´ ε` εm`k´1
,
where paq follows from Wald’s Identity upon observing that tZjujPN is an i.i.d. sequence
independent from the nonnegative integer valued random variable Y˜H . Likewise, pbq is due
to Wald’s Identity as tC˜iuiPN is an i.i.d. sequence independent from the nonnegative integer
valued TwfIH .
If we ignore the cases in which the goal is reached while going back to VD from another
clique, the value we obtain can only be greater than the actual expected intentional goal-
hitting time. Then, with time being indexed by Lp¨q, the strategy ψk evolves in an identical
manner with ψwf and the expected intentional goal-hitting time under ψwf provides an
upper bound for E
`
LpT kIHq
˘
. Thus, writing EpT kIH q “ E
`
LpT kIHq
˘` EˆCo
TkIH
˙
, we conclude
EpT kq ď E `LpT kIHq˘` E´CoTkIH¯ ď EpTwfIH q ` EpTwfIH qEpC˜1q1´ ε` εm`k´1 “ EpTwfIH q ` EpT
wf
IH qpkq
p1´ εqpm` k ´ 1q ` ε .
This completes the proof of Proposition 3. ˝
C.7 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. First, let us calculate the probability that the difference between the two goal-hitting
times is equal to d P t1, ...,Knu. By conditioning on the value of TψIH , we get
PpTψIH ´ Tψ “ dq “
Kn`1ÿ
h“1`d
PpTψIH ´ Tψ “ d
ˇˇ
TψIH “ hqPpTψIH “ hq
ď
Kn`1ÿ
h“1`d
PpTψ “ h´ d ˇˇTψIH “ hq
“
Kn`1ÿ
h“1`d
ˆ
1´ 1
n
˙h´d´1
1
n
“1´
ˆ
1´ 1
n
˙Kn´d
ď1´
ˆ
1´ 1
n
˙Kn
. (53)
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Next, we write the expected difference between the two goal-hitting times as below and use
Eq. (53):
EpTψIH ´ Tψq “
Knÿ
d“1
dPpTψIH ´ Tψ “ dq
ď
Knÿ
d“1
d
˜
1´
ˆ
1´ 1
n
˙Kn¸
“
˜
1´
ˆ
1´ 1
n
˙Kn¸ KnpKn ` 1q
2
“σn.
Thus, we have EpTψIH q ď EpTψq ` σn and limnÑ8σn “ 0, as Kn ! n. This completes the
proof. ˝
C.8 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. For any fixed agent strategy ψ, let
tpψq P arg max
tPN PpT
ψ
IH “ tq.
Consider the adversary strategy χ˜ where the adversary makes a prediction at tpψq equal to
the agent’s state at that period, i.e., Dˆtpψq “ Xtpψq. Under χ˜, the prediction risk of ψ is
given by
qpψ, χ˜q “ PpTψ “ tpψqq.
The success event tT “ tpψqu of the adversary can be written as the following union of
events
tT “ tpψqu “ tT “ tpψq, TIH ą tpψqu Y tT “ tpψq, TIH “ tpψqu,
where under the first event the goal-hitting time is due to a random hit to the goal and
under the latter it is due to an intentional hit. Ignoring the first event we have
PpT “ tpψqq ě PpT “ tpψq, TIH “ tpψqq.
Next, we condition on tTIH “ tpψqu and obtain:
PpT “ tpψq, TIH “ tpψqq “PpT “ tpψq
ˇˇ
TIH “ tpψqqPpTIH “ tpψqq
paq“
ˆ
1´ 1
n
˙tpψq´1
q˜ψ
pbqě
ˆ
1´ 1
n
˙Kn
q˜ψ,
where paq follows upon observing that conditional on tTIH “ tpψqu, for the goal-hitting time
to coincide with the intentional goal-hitting time, it must be the case that there have been
no random hits to the goal in the first tpψq´1 periods. Further, pbq is due to tpψq ď Kn`1.
Finally, we let δ¯n “ 1´
`
1´ 1n
˘Kn
and observe that lim
nÑ8 δ¯n “ 0 holds, since Kn ! n. Thus,
we conclude q˚pψq ě qpψ, χq ě `1´ δ¯n˘ q˜ψ. ˝
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C.9 Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. In order to prove that the Water-Filling Strategy solves the given optimization
problem, we will first write the expected intentional goal-hitting time as follows,
EpTIH q “ EpTIH
ˇˇ
TIH ě t˚qPpTIH ě t˚q ` EpTIH
ˇˇ
TIH ă t˚qPpTIH ă t˚q.
Conditional on the event tTIH ě t˚u, where t˚ “ 1q¯ ´ ε1´ε , the Water-Filling Strategy
minimizes the conditional expectation EpTIH
ˇˇ
TIH ě t˚q. This is because the Water-Filling
Strategy tries to reach the goal greedily at every period after t˚, by setting pt “ 1. Indeed,
given that TψIH is strictly greater than t
˚´1, the conditional expected value EpTψIH
ˇˇ
TψIH ě t˚q
needs to be at least t˚ ´ 1` 11´ε , where 11´ε is the stochastic shortest path diameter of the
complete graph. However, the expression t˚´1` 11´ε is exactly the conditional expectation
of TwfIH under the same event,
EpTψIH
ˇˇ
TψIH ě t˚q ě t˚ ´ 1`
1
1´ ε “ EpT
wf
IH
ˇˇ
TwfIH ě t˚q.
Hence, the term EpTIH
ˇˇ
TIH ě t˚q is minimized under the Water-Filling Strategy.
Recall that under ψwfq¯ , we have PpTψIH “ tq “ q¯ for all t ă t˚. Thus, the probability
that the intentional goal-hitting time is greater than t˚, i.e., PpTψIH ě t˚q, is minimized
under the Water-Filling Strategy subject to the requirement that at any period we have
PpTψIH “ tq ď q¯.
To see this, suppose that there exists some feasible strategy ψ such that PpTψIH ě t˚q ă
PpTwfIH ě t˚q “ 1´ q¯t˚. Equivalently, for ψ we have
1´ PpTψIH ě t˚q “ PpTψIH ă t˚q ą q¯t˚.
On the other hand, feasibility requires max
tPN PpT
ψ
IH “ tq ď q¯. Thus, if ψ is feasible, we must
have
PpTψIH ă t˚q “ PpTψIH ď t˚ ´ 1q ď q¯pt˚ ´ 1q,
since otherwise the condition max
tPN PpT
ψ
IH “ tq ď q¯ is violated. However, we have reached
a contradiction: PpTψIH ă t˚q ď q¯pt˚ ´ 1q and PpTψIH ă t˚q ą q¯t˚. Thus, we conclude
that there does not exist any such strategy and that ψwfq¯ minimizes PpTψIH ě t˚q among all
feasible strategies. Also, note that ψwfq¯ maximizes PpTψIH ă t˚q since the two expressions
sum up to 1.
We have so far established that ψwfq¯ minimizes EpTψIH
ˇˇ
TψIH ě t˚qPpTψIH ě t˚q. Conse-
quently, if there exists a strategy ψ such that EpTψIH q ă EpTwfIH q, for this strategy we must
have:
t˚´1ÿ
t“1
tPpTψIH “ tq ă
t˚´1ÿ
t“1
tPpTwfIH “ tq, (54)
while satisfying
ř8
t“1 PpTψIH “ tq “ 1. We will now show that this is not possible.
First, note that having PpTψIH “ tq ą PpTwfIH “ tq for some t ă t˚ results in infeasibility
since PpTwfIH “ tq “ q¯. Then, for the strict inequality in Eq. (54) to hold, we must have
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PpTψIH “ t˜q “ PpTwfIH “ t˜q´δ for some t˜ ă t˚ and δ ą 0. Since PpTψIH ă t˚q is maximal under
ψwfq¯ , there must exist a set of indices tt1, ..., tku such that k ě 1, ti ě t˚ for all i “ 1, ..., k
and the following holds,
PpTψIH “ t1q ` ...` PpTψIH “ tkq “ PpTwfIH “ t1q ` ...` PpTwfIH “ tkq ` δ.
Without loss of generality, let k “ 1. For the expectations, because t˜ ă t˚ ď t1, it follows
that
EpTψIH q “ EpTwfIH q ´ δt˜` δt1 ą EpTwfIH q.
Accordingly, we can conclude that it is not possible to construct a strategy ψ for which the
expected intentional goal-hitting time is smaller than that under the Water-Filling Strategy
without violating the constraint. For this reason, the Water-Filling Strategy solves the given
optimization problem and we conclude the proof. ˝
C.10 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. For completeness, we include the proof of the lower bound in Theorem 1 of Tsitsiklis
and Xu (2018) and point out some minor changes from the prior work.
Fix an agent strategy ψ for which EpT q ď w. Define
tpψq P arg max
tPN PpT “ tq, (55)
and suppose the adversary’s strategy, denoted by χt, consists of predicting the goal vertex to
be agent’s state at time tpψq, i.e., Dˆ “ Xtpψq. We note that the offline adversary strategy χt
only needs to choose a prediction, whereas the strategy defined in Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018)
also needs to specify the timing of the prediction. This implies that the probability that the
adversary succeeds is equal to the probability that the goal-hitting time T is equal to tpψq.
Hence, we have
qpψ, χtq ě PpT “ tpψqq “ max
tPN PpT “ tq
paqě 1
2EpT q ` 1
pbqě 1
2w ` 1 . (56)
where step pbq follows from the assumption EpT q ď w and paq applies Lemma 11 on T :
Lemma 11. Let Y be a random variable taking values in N. Then, there exists y P N such
that
PpY “ yq ě 1
2EpY q ` 1 . (57)
Finally, we prove Lemma 11 by contradiction. Let µ “ EpY q. Suppose, for the sake of
contradiction, that for all y P N, PpY “ yq ă 12w`1 holds. Then, we have
PpY ě iq “ 1´ PpY ă iq “ 1´
i´1ÿ
j“1
PpY “ iq ą 1´ pi´ 1q
2w ` 1 .
Next, we derive EpY q as follows and obtain a contradiction:
µ “
8ÿ
i“1
PpY ě iq ě
t2µ`1uÿ
i“1
PpY ě iq ą
t2µ`1uÿ
i“1
1´ pi´ 1q
2w ` 1 “ t2µ` 1u´
t2µ` 1u´ 1
2
ě µ.
This completes the proof of the lower bound in Theorem 4. ˝
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